Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540

Background

Spokeo operates an online "people search" that compiles and publishes personal profiles from many data sources; Robins discovered an inaccurate Spokeo profile about him.
Robins sued Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), alleging willful failure to follow FCRA accuracy and procedural requirements and seeking statutory/actual damages on behalf of himself and a class.
The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing; the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Robins had alleged individualized statutory harms sufficient for injury in fact.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Robins adequately alleged a concrete and particularized injury in fact under Article III.
The Court held the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was incomplete because it addressed particularization but not the separate requirement of concreteness, vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded for consideration of whether the alleged procedural violations produce a concrete injury or merely abstract procedural violations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Robins has Article III standing (injury in fact) to sue under FCRA	Robins alleged Spokeo published inaccurate, reputation- and employability-related information about him, i.e., individualized harm from statutory violations	Spokeo argued mere statutory violations and procedural failures (without concrete harm) do not automatically establish Article III injury	Court: Standing requires an injury that is both particularized and concrete; Ninth Circuit addressed particularity but failed to analyze concreteness, so remand required
Whether a statutory procedural violation alone can satisfy concreteness	Robins: Congress can elevate certain intangible harms (including informational harms) to concrete injuries via statute	Spokeo: Procedural or informational violations may be bare and abstract without real risk of harm, so not all statutory violations confer standing	Court: Congress’ judgment is important but cannot bypass Article III; a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm or material risk, is insufficient; risk of real harm can suffice in some contexts
Whether Spokeo qualifies as a consumer reporting agency under FCRA (for purposes of standing)	Robins: Alleged Spokeo met statutory definition and its profile was a consumer report bearing on personal characteristics relevant to employment/credit	Spokeo disputed applicability (assumed below); factual question for trial	Court assumed, for opinion purposes, that Spokeo is a consumer reporting agency and left merits/factual findings to lower courts on remand

Key Cases Cited

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (establishes the three Article III standing elements and that injury must be concrete and particularized)
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (discusses particularized and concrete injury requirements)
Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (procedural-right deprivation without concrete interest is insufficient for standing)
Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (Congress can create informational rights whose denial may constitute concrete injury)
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (violation of statutorily conferred right to truthful information can be an Article III injury)
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (Article III limits on judicial power and separation-of-powers concerns)
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (standing rooted in case-or-controversy limitation)
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (plaintiff must plead personal injury, not generalized grievance)