Spivey v. City of Bellevue
187 Wash. 2d 716
| Wash. | 2017Background
- Two Bellevue firefighters (Larson and Spivey) diagnosed with malignant melanoma claimed workers’ compensation under RCW 51.32.185, which creates a statutory presumption that melanoma in firefighters is occupational.
- Department initially allowed Larson’s claim; City appealed to the Board, which reversed. Larson then appealed to superior court; the jury was asked whether the City rebutted the presumption and answered that it had not. Larson obtained judgment and fees.
- Spivey’s claim was denied by the Department; the Board found the City had rebutted the presumption. On appeal to superior court, the judge ruled as a matter of law that the City had rebutted the presumption and excluded references to the statute at trial.
- The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals to resolve (1) whether rebuttal of the firefighter presumption is a question of fact or law, (2) how the presumption operates on appeal, (3) the propriety of Larson’s jury instruction on burdens, and (4) entitlement to attorney fees incurred at the Board level.
- The Court emphasized that the Industrial Insurance Act is remedial and to be liberally construed in favor of workers and that RCW 51.32.185 reflects a strong social policy to aid firefighters in proving causation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether rebuttal of the firefighter presumption is a question of fact or law | Larson: it is a factual question for the jury; trial may decide whether Board was wrong. | City: court should decide rebuttal as a matter of law in all cases. | Factual question; jury may decide whether employer rebutted presumption (Spivey reversed; Larson affirmed). |
| Effect of the presumption (Thayer vs. Morgan theory) | Larson: statute embodies strong policy; presumption shifts both production and persuasion to employer (Morgan). | City: presumption merely shifts production; vanishes after employer produces contrary evidence (Thayer). | Applies Morgan theory to RCW 51.32.185: employer bears burden of production and persuasion (preponderance). |
| Interaction of RCW 51.32.185 with RCW 51.52.115 (Board decision presumed correct on appeal) | Larson: RCW 51.52.115 does not eliminate the original burdens; superior court must determine whether Board met the applicable burden/presumption. | City: RCW 51.52.115 governs and should prevent instructing jury about Board-level burdens. | RCW 51.52.115 does not flip or replace burdens at Department/Board level; jury may be informed of prior burdens so it can assess whether Board’s decision was erroneous. |
| Recovery of attorney fees for Board-level work when firefighter ultimately prevails on appeal | Larson: RCW 51.32.185(7) authorizes recovery of all reasonable costs of the appeal, including fees for Board work. | City: superior court cannot award fees for services before the Board; fees limited to court-level services. | Larson entitled to fees/costs incurred at Board and court levels under RCW 51.32.185(7); award affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gorre v. City of Tacoma, 184 Wn.2d 30 (Wash. 2015) (discusses burden generally in occupational disease claims under IIA)
- Department of Labor & Industries v. Rowley, 185 Wn.2d 186 (Wash. 2016) (clarifies appellate standard under RCW 51.52.115)
- Luna de la Puente v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618 (Wash. 1936) (court may permit jury to decide whether a presumption has been rebutted)
- La Vera v. Department of Labor & Industries, 45 Wn.2d 413 (Wash. 1954) (prior rule on immateriality of board-level burden in some appeals; distinguished here)
- Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 34 Wn.2d 498 (Wash. 1949) (worker generally bears burden to prove occupational disease)
- Harbor Plywood Corp. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 48 Wn.2d 553 (Wash. 1956) (policy favoring awards of attorney fees to ensure adequate representation)
- Borenstein v. Department of Labor & Industries, 49 Wn.2d 674 (Wash. 1957) (general rule limiting fee recovery to court-level services; distinguished by statute-specific fee provision here)
- Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wn.2d 251 (Wash. 1992) (jurors presumed to follow instructions)
- Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wn.2d 237 (Wash. 2002) (instruction error reversal requires prejudice)