SPIN-Learning, LLC v. Ascend Learning, LLC, 1:24-cv-10583

Bridgette Bryan worked for Ascend Learning, LLC and its subsidiary ATI for over 11 years, eventually serving as Director of NCLEX Services; she alleges she never signed a non-compete or confidentiality agreement.
Bryan resigned in May 2022; subsequently, Ascend sent her a cease-and-desist letter referencing an agreement she claims was forged after her departure.
Bryan created SPIN-Learning, LLC, a coaching service for nursing students, which had limited business success with one institutional client.
Ascend and ATI (the Company) separately sued Bryan and SPIN for, among other things, copyright infringement and breach of the alleged agreement; Bryan counterclaimed for fraud (based on forgery), but her counterclaims were dismissed.
In this separate action, Bryan and SPIN asserted antitrust, tortious interference, defamation, commercial disparagement, and Massachusetts Ch. 93A claims against the Company and individuals; defendants moved to dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP statute and for failure to state a claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Anti-SLAPP Dismissal	Defendants’ conduct went beyond petitioning by contacting clients	All claims are based on protected petitioning activity	Denied—private outreach was not protected
Antitrust—Market Definition	Defined market as ATI/Ascend’s nursing school product users	No proper or specific market defined	Granted—market definition insufficient
Tortious Interference	Defendants had improper motive and means, harming business	No improper motive; actions were to protect legal interests	Granted—no sufficient pleading of impropriety
Defamation/Disparagement	Defendants’ statements about “stealing” were false and damaging	Statements were true or not pled with sufficient particularity	Granted—fault element not sufficiently pled
Ch. 93A Claim	Defendants’ actions were unfair business practices	Claims rest on same conduct as failed statutory/tort claims	Granted—no independent basis pled
Injunctive Relief as Claim	Sought as standalone count and in prayers for relief	Not a proper standalone cause of action	Granted—not a proper standalone claim
Leave to Amend	Sought leave to amend defective claims	Opposed by implication	Granted—leave to amend allowed

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standards require factual, not conclusory, allegations)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (complaints require plausible factual allegations)
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (elements of a Section 2 Sherman Act violation)
Coastal Fuels of P.R., Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182 (relevant market definition in antitrust)
Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76 (elements of defamation under Massachusetts law)
Blackstone v. Cashman, 860 N.E.2d 7 (elements of tortious interference under Massachusetts law)
HipSaver, Inc. v. Kiel, 984 N.E.2d 755 (standard for commercial disparagement in Massachusetts)