669 F. App'x 38
2d Cir.2016Background
- Plaintiff Michael Spiegel, pro se, sued defendants (including Erin Bekowies) asserting tort claims arising from his employment at the Hotel Edison, which was covered by a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA).
- District Court dismissed Spiegel’s claims as preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); Spiegel appealed.
- Spiegel argued his tortious-interference-with-contract claim was not preempted because he did not allege breach of the CBA.
- The district court held Spiegel’s state-law tort claims required proving breach or interference with contractual rights governed by the CBA.
- The Second Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed, concluding Spiegel’s tortious-interference and related tort claims were preempted because resolution would require interpreting the CBA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Spiegel’s tortious-interference-with-contract claim is preempted by the LMRA | Spiegel: No breach of the CBA alleged, so claim is purely a state tort and not preempted | Defendants: Claim requires proving breach/interference with rights under the CBA, so §301 preempts it | Held: Preempted — New York requires pleading breach; §301 preempts interference with a CBA |
| Whether Spiegel could amend to cure pleading defects | Spiegel: Amendment could avoid preemption by adding facts but no breach alleged originally | Defendants: Amendment would be futile because any properly pleaded interference claim would still implicate the CBA | Held: Amendment would be futile; dismissal proper |
| Whether tortious-interference-with-business-relations/prospective-economic-opportunities claims are viable | Spiegel: These are distinct torts recoverable independently | Defendants: Under NY law they are coextensive and cannot be used to attack relationships governed by contract | Held: Dismissed — these claims are coextensive and barred when the relationship is contractually governed |
| Overall dismissal under LMRA preemption | Spiegel: Remaining arguments merit keeping some claims | Defendants: All claims depend on CBA interpretation and thus fall under §301 | Held: All remaining arguments without merit; judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Premium Mortgage Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2009) (de novo review of preemption principles)
- Wynn v. AC Rochester, 273 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001) (§301 provides broad jurisdiction and preempts state claims that depend on CBA interpretation)
- Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2003) (state-law claims may be preempted even if complaint omits federal law)
- NBT Bancorp Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Grp., Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 614 (N.Y. 1996) (New York requires pleading breach to sustain tortious-interference-with-contract)
- Anderson v. Aset Corp., 416 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2005) (LMRA preempts tortious interference with a CBA)
- 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015) (tortious-interference-with-business-relations and with prospective economic advantage treated similarly)
- Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 3 N.Y.3d 182 (N.Y. 2004) (cannot bring tortious interference when relationship governed by contract)
- Nicosia v. Bd. of Managers of Weber House Condo., 77 A.D.3d 455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2010) (no tortious-interference-with-prospective-advantage where parties had contracted)