898 F.3d 754
7th Cir.2018Background
- Susan Spicher applied for SSDI and SSI for disability dating to 2003, claiming multiple chronic conditions including obesity, osteoarthritis, COPD, degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, and morbid obesity.
- An ALJ initially found non-disability through May 30, 2012; the district court remanded because the ALJ had not properly evaluated obesity and its combined effects with other impairments.
- On remand the ALJ held a new hearing (May 25, 2016); Spicher narrowed her onset date contention to whether she was disabled as of her date last insured, December 31, 2008.
- The ALJ again found Spicher not disabled until September 20, 2012, concluding a sedentary RFC with specific limitations and relying on vocational expert testimony identifying three jobs.
- The ALJ gave “great weight” to consultative examiner Dr. Crystal Strong but omitted certain limitations she recommended (e.g., periodic ambulation up to 20 minutes; postural restrictions). The ALJ also declined to consider the lasting effects of a humerus fracture and did not address evidence of carpal tunnel.
- Spicher appealed, arguing (1) the ALJ prejudged the case (due process), and (2) the RFC and step-five findings lack substantial evidence because the ALJ ignored or failed to explain contrary medical evidence and failed to account for combined impairments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the ALJ’s statements at the remand hearing violate Spicher’s due process right to an impartial decisionmaker? | ALJ showed bias and prejudgment (remarks about sticking to prior finding; asking if counsel wanted to go to federal court again). | ALJ’s comments show frustration but not the deep-seated antagonism required to vacate a hearing. | No due process violation; comments were troubling but did not meet the high Liteky standard for remand. |
| Did the ALJ’s RFC and step-five determination rest on substantial evidence given Dr. Strong’s contrary findings? | Dr. Strong recommended against a completely sedentary job (ambulation every ~20 minutes) and documented exam findings suggesting trouble with balance, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling. ALJ ignored/failed to explain rejection of these limitations. | ALJ relied on record and vocational testimony; agency argued some of Dr. Strong’s comments were recommendations not mandates and that DOT showed identified jobs did not require the postural activities. | The ALJ failed to build an accurate and logical bridge: remand required because the ALJ did not adequately explain why she rejected/omitted Dr. Strong’s ambulation recommendation and postural observations. |
| Did the ALJ properly consider the combined effects of obesity and non-severe impairments (humerus fracture, carpal tunnel)? | ALJ ignored interaction of obesity with the permanent mild effects of a humerus fracture and ignored evidence of carpal tunnel; must consider all medically determinable impairments when assessing RFC. | ALJ treated some conditions as not severe or time-limited and therefore did not incorporate them into RFC. | Error: ALJ must consider non-severe impairments in combination with severe ones; remand required to assess humerus fracture and carpal tunnel in combination with obesity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Keith v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2007) (due-process standard for ALJ bias; remand only for deep-seated antagonism)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (standard for judicial disqualification for bias)
- Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001) (five-step sequential evaluation overview; substantial-evidence review)
- Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2002) (requirement that ALJ build an accurate and logical bridge from evidence to conclusion)
- Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2001) (same; standards for RFC reasoning)
- Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2014) (ALJ may not ignore evidence that undercuts her conclusion)
- Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2000) (ALJ must give reasons when rejecting examining physician’s opinions)
- Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1996) (procedural requirements for weighing medical opinions)
- Herrmann v. Colvin, 772 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2014) (DOT is obsolete; caution using DOT alone to resolve job requirements)
- Browning v. Colvin, 766 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing limits of DOT reliance)
- Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2003) (ALJ must consider claimant-raised impairments and supporting evidence)
- Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2008) (ALJs should consider consequences of doctors’ recommendations)