Spicer v. Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Trust, 2011 Mo. LEXIS 79

Gwen Spicer and Donald Spicer owned a home at 5367 Southview Hills Court in St. Louis; Donald executed a deed May 31, 2007 purporting to transfer a one-half undivided interest to the Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Trust U/T/A 2002, and Donald died July 3, 2007 while married to Spicer.
Spicer filed a petition to quiet title Aug 21, 2007 naming the trust as defendant and sought cancellation of the deed and a ruling that she held title free of the trust, asserting she never executed any marital waiver or conveyance.
Counsel answered on behalf of the trust, stipulating to much of Spicer’s petition but arguing the deed operated as a unilateral termination of tenancy by the entirety.
On Jan 22, 2008 the trial court granted summary judgment canceling the deed but crossed out the attorney’s fees provision and costs, indicating no fees would be awarded.
A Trustee’s Motion to Set Aside Judgment was filed Feb 2008 by the trust’s trustee (not originally named as a party), arguing lack of jurisdiction because the trust was not named as a defendant and the trustee was not a party to the suit.
Settlement negotiations occurred before trial; a purported settlement was reached but denied by Spicer; the trial court later enforced a settlement and, on June 24, 2009, ordered the parties to sign a consent order and judgment, which Spicer did not sign; she filed a notice of appeal on Aug 27, 2009.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Judgment I was a final judgment for purposes of appeal.	Spicer argues Judgment I was not final because issues like attorney’s fees remained.	Trustees contend Judgment I disposed all issues and was final.	Judgment I was a final judgment.
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside Judgment I after it became final.	Spicer asserts the court lost jurisdiction after finality and could not set aside the judgment.	Trustees argue the Trustee’s Motion extended jurisdiction.	Court lacked jurisdiction to set aside Judgment I after finality.
Whether the Trustee’s Motion to Set Aside Judgment operated as an authorized post-trial motion.	Motion did not involve a party to the suit and thus could not extend jurisdiction.	Trustees rely on Rule 81.05 to extend jurisdiction when timely motions are filed.	Trustee’s motion was not an authorized post-trial motion.
Whether the notice of appeal was timely filed.	Appeal timely if within the allowed period after final judgment.	Notice of appeal filed over a year after final Judgment I; untimely.	Appellate jurisdiction not present; appeal must be dismissed.

Avidan v. Transit Cas. Co., 20 S.W.3d 521 (Mo. banc 2000) (finality and disposition of all issues necessary for final judgment)
Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. banc 1987) (authorized after-trial motions extend jurisdiction)
Williams v. Williams, 41 S.W.3d 877 (Mo. banc 2001) (finality rules; motion timing governs jurisdiction)
Wolfner v. Dalton, 955 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. banc 1997) (limitations on nonparties and intervention; party-status rules affecting jurisdiction)
Randall, 423 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. banc 1968) (trial court cannot divest finality after judgment)
Ravenhill, 776 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. banc 1989) (jurisdictional limits after final judgments; effect on subsequent orders)