SPICER v. BIDEN, 575 F.Supp.3d 93

On Sept. 8, 2021, President Biden solicited resignations from Sean Spicer and Russell Vought as members of the U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors; when they did not resign, their positions were terminated.
Plaintiffs sued the President and several officials (Katherine Petrelius; Catherine Russell) and named Board Chairman Charles Ruppersberger and Designated Federal Officer Raphael Thalakottur in their official capacities.
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to treat them as present Board members so they could participate in scheduled Board meetings.
The court first considered Article III standing and held plaintiffs could obtain redress because relief against subordinate Board officials (Ruppersberger and Thalakottur) could substantially redress the injury (relying on Swan v. Clinton).
On the merits the court concluded the President’s removal power is presumptive where no statutory removal restriction exists; 10 U.S.C. §8468 creates term lengths but contains no for-cause protection, so the President could remove the plaintiffs.
The court also found plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm or that the public interest favored an injunction and therefore denied the motion for a preliminary injunction; it ordered the parties to propose a scheduling plan.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Article III standing / redressability	Plaintiffs are injured by removal and can be made whole by ordering Board officers to treat them as members	Presidential removal itself is generally non-justiciable; some defendants (Petrelius, Russell) lack authority to redress	Plaintiffs have substantial likelihood of standing because relief against Board officials (Ruppersberger, Thalakottur) could redress injury (Swan relied on)
Presidential removal power vs. term provision	Term-of-office in 10 U.S.C. §8468 protects members from removal during term	Term lengths alone do not limit removal absent an express statutory restriction	Court: Term provision does not constrain Presidential removal power; President could remove at will (Parsons, Myers, Seila Law, Collins cited)
Likelihood of success on the merits	Removal was unlawful so plaintiffs likely to succeed	No statutory protection; longstanding precedents permit removal	Plaintiffs unlikely to succeed; preliminary injunction fails First Winter factor
Irreparable harm / public interest	Loss of Board membership and exclusion from meetings is irreparable; public interest favors dissenting views	Plaintiffs gave no showing of certain, imminent harm or distinct public benefit	Court: Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm or that public interest favors injunction; injunction denied

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standards)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requirements)
Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (relief against subordinate officials can redress removal)
Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897) (term provisions construed as limitations, not removal grants)
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (President’s removal power principles)
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (distinguishing term length from removal protections)
Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021) (unconstitutional statutory restriction on removal)
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866) (limitations on enjoining the President)
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (judicial limits on ordering Presidential performance)