1:19-cv-00011
D.V.I.Aug 31, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Emily Sperber sued individually and as next friend to her minor daughter V.S. after an incident at a St. Croix condominium on Sept. 22, 2017; defendant Jeremy Latchman was a HIDTA/DEA employee.
- Bourne (owner) had authorized Latchman to enter the condo to retrieve supplies; Sperber was overseeing the unit.
- A dispute arose when Sperber attempted to retrieve the key; Latchman grabbed the key, accused her of trespass, threatened to remove her, then physically restrained her — twisting her wrist, slamming her against a wall, partially handcuffing her, carrying her outside and handcuffing her to a gate. V.S. witnessed the incident.
- Sperber alleges physical and emotional injuries; she and V.S. asserted common-law tort claims and a Bivens Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim against Latchman and the United States.
- The United States Attorney certified under the Westfall Act that Latchman acted within the scope of his employment; Latchman moved to dismiss.
- Court disposition: granted in part and denied in part — FTCA/tort claims against Latchman dismissed and the United States substituted; the Bivens Fourth Amendment claim against Latchman in his individual capacity survives dismissal (qualified-immunity defense denied at this stage).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Latchman’s tortious conduct falls outside the scope of employment such that he can be sued individually under common law | Sperber alleges intentional assault and excessive force by Latchman, arguing conduct was personal and not within employment scope | Shappert certification and declarations show Latchman was performing DEA COOP duties (retrieving supplies, checking property) and thus acted within scope | Court accepted certification as prima facie, found Plaintiffs failed to rebut, substituted the United States under Westfall Act and dismissed tort claims against Latchman |
| Whether Latchman is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment (Bivens) excessive-force claim | Sperber alleges an unreasonable seizure and excessive force (no crime suspected, no threat, force disproportionate) | Latchman contends his actions were reasonable in context and he is entitled to qualified immunity | Court held Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a constitutional violation and the right was clearly established; unresolved factual disputes preclude dismissal on qualified immunity at this stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Lomando v. United States, 667 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2011) (Westfall Act/absolute immunity framework for federal employees)
- Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1992) (scope-of-employment certification is prima facie evidence; plaintiff must rebut)
- Brumfield v. Sanders, 232 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 2000) (use state law respondeat superior to determine scope of employment)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified-immunity standard for government officials)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive-force/ Fourth Amendment reasonableness framework)
- Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard)
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Bivens cause of action for constitutional violations by federal officers)