Spencer v. Wayne
80 N.E.3d 764
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- On July 12, 2012, Spencer (plaintiff), a caregiver, exited Strenger’s vehicle in Strenger’s garage, stepped on a mat and fell, injuring herself. The complaint alleged Strenger’s negligence in placement/maintenance of the mat and failure to warn.
- Strenger admitted Spencer stepped onto the mat but denied the mat slipped and caused the fall.
- Strenger died during litigation; her special representative, Gail Strenger Wayne, moved for summary judgment invoking Illinois’s Dead-Man’s Act (735 ILCS 5/8-201), arguing Spencer’s testimony about the event was barred because it occurred in the decedent’s presence.
- Spencer argued the Act did not bar her testimony because Strenger could not have seen the cause of the fall (e.g., Spencer’s feet/mat) and thus could not have rebutted it; deposition excerpts and later proffered reports described Spencer’s account.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Wayne, concluding the event occurred in Strenger’s presence and Spencer’s testimony about the fall was barred; the court also denied reconsideration and refused to consider later-submitted evidence as it was available earlier.
- The appellate court affirmed, holding the Dead-Man’s Act applied to bar Spencer’s testimony and that the additional evidence would not raise a genuine issue of proximate cause even if considered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Dead‑Man’s Act bars Spencer’s testimony about what caused her fall | Spencer: Act should not bar her; Strenger was in driver’s seat and could not see the slipping mat, so could not rebut Spencer’s account | Wayne: The fall occurred in Strenger’s presence so Spencer is barred from testifying as to the event; without that testimony plaintiff has no admissible proof | Held: Act applies — event was in decedent’s presence; Spencer’s testimony about the fall is barred because her testimony that Strenger couldn’t see is itself barred |
| Whether Argueta v. Krivickas requires a different result (i.e., permit testimony where decedent could not have observed) | Spencer: Argueta allows testimony when admissible evidence shows the decedent could not have observed the relevant facts | Wayne: Argueta is distinguishable; here no admissible evidence shows Strenger couldn’t observe the fall | Held: Argueta is distinguishable — admissible evidence did not show decedent lacked observational ability; Spencer relied on her own barred testimony |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion by refusing to consider evidence submitted with the motion to reconsider | Spencer: The additional deposition excerpts, employer report, and medical report create a genuine issue of fact and constitute newly presented evidence | Wayne: Evidence was available before the summary‑judgment hearing and thus properly excluded; even considered, it does not create a genuine issue of proximate cause | Held: Denial affirmed — court properly refused to consider previously available evidence and, even if considered, it did not create a genuine issue of proximate cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32 (Illinois 2004) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Reed v. Galaxy Holdings, Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d 39 (Ill. App. 2009) (elements of negligence and causation principles)
- Kean v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 235 Ill. 2d 351 (Illinois 2009) (principles of statutory construction; plain‑language inquiry)
- Balma v. Henry, 404 Ill. App. 3d 233 (Ill. App. 2010) (purpose and scope of the Dead‑Man’s Act)
- Compton v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 382 Ill. App. 3d 323 (Ill. App. 2008) (standard for reviewing motions to reconsider/new evidence)