524 P.3d 165
Utah Ct. App.2023Background
- Reagan and Amber Spencer divorced in 2014 with a stipulated decree awarding joint legal and physical custody of their two children after mediation and a custody evaluation process.
- Reagan repeatedly alleged Amber had alcohol and drug problems, poor parenting, and unsafe home conditions; he filed multiple orders to show cause and two petitions to modify custody seeking sole physical custody.
- The court entered various temporary orders over time, including a temporary award of physical custody to Reagan in 2018 with supervised parent-time for Amber and requirements for counseling and compliance with a DCFS plan; supervision was later lifted but Amber was ordered to submit to random alcohol testing.
- DCFS investigated after Reagan reported Amber for drinking and driving; DCFS found both homes posed low current risk and recommended no services; Amber completed extensive negative breathalyzer testing (about 75 tests with one minute trace attributed to cough syrup).
- At a September 2020 bench trial the district court found Reagan’s evidence exaggerated and uncorroborated, relied on DCFS findings and negative alcohol tests, denied Reagan’s petition to modify custody, resolved related financial disputes, denied Reagan attorney fees, and awarded Amber attorney fees for prevailing on some claims.
Issues
| Issue | Reagan's Argument | Amber's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a lower change-in-circumstances showing applies because custody was stipulated | The stipulated custody decree warrants a lesser showing to modify custody | The decree arose after extensive litigation and evaluation, so the normal standard applies | Court applied general substantial-and-material-change standard; affirmed |
| Whether the district court abused discretion in denying modification based on alleged alcohol/mental-health harm | Reagan: Amber’s alleged escalating alcohol and mental-health issues endangered the children and warranted sole custody | Amber: Evidence (DCFS report, extensive negative tests, counseling) shows no such harm; Reagan’s evidence was uncorroborated | Court found Reagan’s evidence exaggerated, credited DCFS and testing, and did not abuse discretion in denying modification |
| Whether district court erred on financial findings (childcare/therapy reimbursements, third-party judgment) | Reagan: Court should have enforced prior recommendation/orders requiring Amber reimburse expenses and address judgment | Amber: The supposed March 2019 “order” was only a minute entry; required proofs were not submitted; debt related to Reagan’s personal loans/lease issues | Reagan failed to identify record support or error; court’s financial findings affirmed |
| Whether attorney fees awards were improper | Reagan: He should receive fees (partial wins, certification for trial) and contest Amber’s fee award | Amber: She substantially prevailed on defense of modification and one order to show cause; many fee requests unsupported or untimely | Court reasonably denied Reagan fees and awarded Amber fees; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Peeples v. Peeples, 456 P.3d 1159 (Utah Ct. App. 2019) (framework for when lesser change-in-circumstances standard may apply to stipulated custody orders)
- Taylor v. Elison, 263 P.3d 448 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (change-in-circumstances requirement protects against frequent custody changes)
- Zavala v. Zavala, 366 P.3d 422 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) (stated lesser showing may support modifying stipulated awards)
- Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (standard for reviewing trial court factual findings in divorce appeals)
- Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (review standards for conclusions of law in divorce matters)
- Hall v. Hall, 316 P.3d 970 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (abuse-of-discretion review for attorney-fee awards in divorce proceedings)
- Roberts v. Roberts, 335 P.3d 378 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (appellant’s burden to identify errors and support arguments on appeal)
- Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (prevailing-party attorney-fee practice on appeal)