Spencer D. Willey v. Bertha I. Willey, Allen F. Willey, Individually, and First Federal Savings Bank of Sheridan, Wyoming as Trustee of the Allen F. Willey Revocable Trust Dated September 12, 2001, as Amended and Restated On November 4, 2010
385 P.3d 290
Wyo.2016Background
- Spencer Willey sued his father Allen, Allen’s wife Bertha, and First Federal (successor trustee) seeking to enjoin sale of the Willey Ranch and to invalidate trust amendments he alleged resulted from Bertha’s undue influence. Allen had executed a 2001 revocable trust naming Spencer and his children as beneficiaries and successor trustees, but later amended and ultimately (Nov. 4, 2010) restated the trust to remove Spencer and favor Bertha and her children.
- Several post-2010 amendments further increased Bertha’s and her children’s benefits and named banking institutions as successor trustees; First Federal ultimately accepted appointment as successor trustee before trial.
- Spencer alleged undue influence (claiming Allen suffered frontal temporal dementia) caused the 2010 restatement and later amendments; he also asserted an oral contract (and promissory estoppel) that he would inherit the ranch.
- The district court granted summary judgment against Spencer on the breach-of-contract/promissory-estoppel claim, found issues of fact on undue influence, and submitted only the validity of the November 4, 2010 amended and restated trust to the jury via a special verdict form.
- A jury found Bertha did not unduly influence Allen regarding the 2010 restatement; the district court denied Spencer’s Rule 59 new-trial motion alleging surprise from late-disclosed amendments. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper jury instruction / burden on undue influence | Burden should shift to Bertha once a confidential/dependent relationship is shown (so she must prove fairness by clear and convincing evidence). | Burden remains with Spencer to prove each element of undue influence. | Held: For testamentary dispositions burden stays with challenger; trial court correctly refused burden-shifting instruction. |
| Special verdict form scope | Jury should consider later trust amendments regardless of 2010 verdict (or, at least, not be cut off). | Only the 2010 restatement was dispositive; if valid, later amendments need not be reached. | Held: Issue waived on appeal (no district-court objection on these grounds); court properly limited jury to 2010 restatement as dispositive. |
| Potential preclusion of future claims by Spencer’s children (E.W., A.W.) | Judgment might unfairly bind/foreclose children’s future claims; jury should render advisory findings on later amendments. | Children are nonparties; their future claims need not be litigated now. | Held: Declined to consider—argument vague, unsupported; children not parties so issue not properly before court. |
| Participation of successor trustee (First Federal) at trial | First Federal should not participate because Spencer was challenging the amendment appointing it. | Trust and amendments remain effective until proven invalid; trustee may defend trust property. | Held: Issue not addressed on merits (no authority cited); court declined to consider Spencer’s argument. |
| Summary judgment on oral contract / promissory estoppel re: ranch | Genuine issues of material fact exist as to existence of oral contract and detrimental reliance. | No definite offer/acceptance/consideration; statute of frauds bars oral transfer of real estate; no promissory-estoppel proof. | Held: Affirmed summary judgment—no material facts showing contract consideration or promissory estoppel; statute of frauds applies. |
| Denial of new trial under W.R.C.P. 59 (late disclosure) | Late disclosure of post-2010 amendments caused surprise and prejudice; new trial warranted. | Spencer waived relief by refusing or not requesting a continuance and elected to proceed; 2010 ruling was dispositive. | Held: Denial affirmed—trial court’s discretion not abused; Spencer had declined continuance and 2010 document was dispositive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bergren v. Berggren, 317 P.2d 1101 (Wyo. 1957) (confidential-relationship doctrine requires close scrutiny of inter vivos transfers)
- Perry v. Vaught, 624 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1981) (recipient in confidential relationship must show fairness and good faith for inter vivos transfers)
- Marchant v. Cook, 967 P.2d 551 (Wyo. 1998) (distinguishes burden-shifting in inter vivos transfers from testamentary dispositions)
- Meyer v. Miller, 330 P.3d 263 (Wyo. 2014) (party contesting testamentary instrument bears burden to prove undue influence)
- Leimbach v. Allen, 976 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1992) (discusses Maryland law distinguishing inter vivos and testamentary transactions on burden shifting)
- Kibbee v. First Interstate Bank, 242 P.3d 973 (Wyo. 2010) (reiterates elements and burden for undue-influence claims in testamentary contexts)