Spencer, C. v. Spencer, L.
1831 MDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 27, 2017Background
- Clinton and Lynnette Spencer were married in 1998, separated in 2010; divorce complaint with equitable distribution claim filed in April 2011.
- Divorce decree entered August 2012 with equitable distribution reserved for later hearing.
- Equitable distribution hearing set for January 2016; Lynnette and her counsel did not attend. Court entered equitable distribution order on February 29, 2016.
- Lynnette filed a petition (June 2, 2016) to open the decree and vacate the equitable distribution order, alleging extrinsic fraud in service and intrinsic fraud in asset misrepresentation; she also sought an extension to comply.
- Trial court held an August 2016 hearing and denied relief on October 6–7, 2016; Lynnette appealed and the Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lynnette) | Defendant's Argument (Clinton) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether equitable distribution order should be vacated for extrinsic fraud (defective/misleading notice) | Notice was sent to an address known or should have been known to be invalid; she did not receive notice, so hearing was unfair | Court record shows multiple attempted service refusals at one address, later accepted service at a different address and received notice for other hearings; court reasonably sent notice to last known address | Denied — no extrinsic fraud; court found notice likely received and ignored |
| Whether decree should be opened for intrinsic fraud (misrepresentation of assets) | Appellee misrepresented marital assets (personal injury settlement, tangible property) warranting opening the decree | Petition was untimely (filed more than 30 days after decree); absent extrinsic fraud, court cannot extend the 30-day limit | Denied — untimely; court lacked discretion to entertain intrinsic-fraud claim beyond 30 days |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by refusing extension of time to comply with equitable distribution | Requested stay/extension based on alleged extrinsic fraud pending resolution | No extrinsic fraud shown; statutory time limits and prior findings foreclose relief | Denied — no abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Egan v. Egan, 759 A.2d 405 (Pa. Super. 2000) (standard of review for opening divorce decrees is abuse of discretion)
- Foley v. Foley, 572 A.2d 6 (Pa. Super. 1990) (same standard referenced for equitable proceedings)
- Justice v. Justice, 612 A.2d 1354 (Pa. Super. 1992) (sets statutory evidentiary and timing rules for opening/vacating divorce decrees)
- Roach v. Roach, 418 A.2d 742 (Pa. Super. 1980) (equitable relief where defendant and counsel received no notice and master proceeded ex parte)
- Fenstermaker v. Fenstermaker, 502 A.2d 185 (Pa. Super. 1985) (defines extrinsic fraud as conduct preventing a fair submission of the controversy)