441 P.3d 271
Wyo.2019Background
- Defendant Justin N. Spence was convicted of one count of incest based on his 14‑year‑old niece AS’s testimony that he sent sexual texts and photos, kissed her, and digitally penetrated her on July 4–5, 2014.
- AS delayed full disclosure: first reported in part on August 12, 2014; did not disclose genital contact until a March 2015 interview after inpatient/residential treatment for behavioral/mental health issues.
- The defense focused heavily on AS’s delayed and inconsistent reporting and other behavioral issues to attack her credibility at trial.
- The State called AS’s counselor, Phillip Archibald, as an expert; he diagnosed AS with PTSD and, on direct examination, testified that the ‘‘underlying basis’’ for that diagnosis was the ‘‘reported sexual abuse.’n
- The prosecutor emphasized Archibald’s statement in closing; Spence objected at trial and on appeal, arguing the testimony impermissibly vouched for the victim and invaded the jury’s fact‑finding role. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether expert testimony identifying the victim’s ‘‘reported sexual abuse’’ as the cause of her PTSD impermissibly vouched for the victim | State: expert may explain PTSD symptoms and behaviors to help jurors understand delayed/inconsistent disclosure; any bolstering is incidental and permissible | Spence: naming the ‘‘reported sexual abuse’’ as the causal trauma impermissibly vouched for AS’s credibility and invaded the jury’s province | Yes. Court: identifying the victim’s report as the specific causal trauma is inferential vouching and was improper |
| Whether Chapman and similar PTSD/CSAAS testimony authority permit the challenged testimony | State: Chapman allows PTSD testimony to explain victim behavior and rebut credibility attacks | Spence: Chapman does not permit experts to identify the charged act as the specific cause of PTSD | Court: Chapman permits general symptom testimony but not expert opinions that the charged abuse caused the PTSD; Archibald’s causation statement exceeded Chapman’s bounds |
| Whether the error was harmless or prejudicial | State: cross‑examination showed other possible stressors; Archibald did not expressly assert guilt | State: the error was not harmless given prosecutor’s closing reliance on expert causation | Court: Prejudicial. Case turned on AS’s credibility; expert causation materially bolstered the State and likely affected the verdict |
| Scope of permissible expert testimony on victim behavior/PTSD | State: experts may describe symptoms, typical victim behavior, and why victims delay/report inconsistently | Spence: such testimony must not be used to prove the truth of the allegations or to identify the charged act as the cause | Court: Permissible: general PTSD/behavioral explanations to dispel myths. Impermissible: opinions that the victim’s claim of abuse is true by identifying the charged event as the causal trauma |
Key Cases Cited
- Chapman v. State, 18 P.3d 1164 (Wyo. 2001) (PTSD/CSAAS testimony may explain victim behavior but cannot prove the abuse occurred)
- Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332 (Wyo. 1992) (investigator’s ‘‘determination’’ that victim was raped impermissibly vouched for credibility)
- Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1993) (CSAAS testimony admissible to explain typical victim responses but not to prove abuse)
- Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988) (expert may not opine on witness credibility; credibility is for the jury)
- State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993) (expert may not testify causally that PTSD symptoms were in fact caused by sexual abuse as that vouches for credibility)