SPEEDWAY LLC v. GLORIA CEVALLOS
20-1120
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Dec 15, 2021Background
- Cevallos slipped and fell at a Speedway gas pump area after a car exited the station, leaving a gasoline/oil puddle; the car had left the area 111 seconds before the fall, and Cevallos sustained multiple fractures requiring surgery.
- Plaintiff's theory: a long-running 'buildup' (discolored, slippery residue) on poured concrete around pumps—caused by inadequate maintenance and training—made the surface dangerous; plaintiff relied mainly on post-fall photos showing brown stains.
- Speedway's evidence: routine policies requiring spill cleanup, 2‑hour pump inspections, monthly pressure cleaning (most recently ~17 days earlier), surveillance showing no spill ~30 minutes before the fall, and testimony (including Speedway expert) that no buildup was evident and the surface was slip‑resistant.
- At trial Speedway moved for directed verdict; the court granted the motion on all claims except constructive notice under Fla. Stat. § 768.0755; after a jury verdict for Cevallos, Speedway appealed the denial of directed verdict on constructive notice.
- The Fourth District reviewed de novo and applied § 768.0755: constructive knowledge can be shown either by (a) the substance existing long enough that the business should have known, or (b) the condition occurring with sufficient regularity to be foreseeable (recurring problems/buildup).
- Holding: reversal—plaintiff failed to prove that a slippery 'buildup' existed or that any condition was present long enough or with sufficient regularity to establish constructive notice; judgment for Speedway directed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constructive notice based on time on the floor | Cevallos argued Speedway had notice of the dangerous condition (generally) | Puddle existed only 111 seconds before fall; insufficient time for imputed constructive notice | Time-based constructive notice fails; 111 seconds insufficient |
| Constructive notice based on recurring/foreseeable 'buildup' | Photos and testimony about lack of concrete‑specific maintenance show recurring buildup and foreseeability | Photos were ambiguous; witnesses (manager, tech, expert) saw no evidence of buildup; Speedway had cleaning protocols/inspections | Recurring/foreseeable theory fails—plaintiff did not prove buildup existed or that inference of Speedway's knowledge was the only reasonable one |
Key Cases Cited
- Hollywood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Alfred, 82 So. 3d 122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (standard of review for directed verdict)
- Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of Palm Beaches, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (directed verdict standard and viewing evidence favorably to nonmovant)
- Frenz Enters., Inc. v. Port Everglades, 746 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (appellate review principles for directed verdict)
- Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001) (constructive notice via recurring problems/foreseeability)
- Walker v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 160 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (short duration of a spill insufficient for constructive notice)
- Hannewacker v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 419 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1982) (limits of photographic evidence to show duration of condition)
- Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Kemp, 324 So. 3d 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (prohibition on stacking speculative inferences in slip‑and‑fall cases)
- Stanley v. Marceaux, 991 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (circumstantial evidence may be conclusive but cannot be stacked upon unproven inferences)
- Broward Exec. Builders, Inc. v. Zota, 192 So. 3d 534 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (only a single reasonable inference from circumstantial evidence may support plaintiff's case)
- Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1960) (foundational authority on limits of inferences from circumstantial evidence)