Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm Homeowners Ass'n
300 Ga. 609
Ga.2017Background
- Southern States applied to the Georgia EPD in May 1989 to develop a landfill and sought a Bartow County zoning compliance certificate; the county denied the request in June 1990 under the then-existing (later-invalidated) ordinance.
- In 1991 Georgia Supreme Court invalidated Bartow County’s zoning ordinance for failing to comply with the Zoning Procedures Law (Tilley Properties).
- Bartow County adopted a new zoning ordinance in September 1993 containing Section 6.1.4: any vested nonconforming use must be actually commenced within one year of the ordinance or be prohibited.
- In September 1994 Bartow County Superior Court held Southern States had acquired a vested right based on its 1989 EPD application and ordered issuance of necessary certificates; the county subsequently issued a zoning compliance certificate and later confirmations from the zoning administrator.
- Southern States obtained an EPD solid-waste permit in 2013; Riverwood Farm sued in 2013 claiming the landfill violated county zoning. The Court of Appeals held Section 6.1.4 applied and would have lapsed Southern States’ vested right for failure to commence within one year, and remanded for a constitutional-as-applied review.
- The Georgia Supreme Court holds Section 6.1.4 unconstitutional as applied to Southern States because it retroactively impairs vested rights by extinguishing a pre-existing vested right based on an impossibly short commencement window.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Section 6.1.4 of the 1993 Bartow County ordinance may be applied to divest Southern States of a vested right acquired in 1989 | Section 6.1.4 retroactively impairs Southern States’ vested right and is unconstitutional as applied | The ordinance validly conditions continuation of nonconforming uses and lapsed Southern States’ right for failure to commence within one year | Held unconstitutional as applied: Section 6.1.4 retroactively and injuriously impaired Southern States’ vested right |
| Whether the one‑year commencement requirement is a permissible minimal condition on vested rights | The one‑year rule is not minimal; it abolishes the vested right regardless of intent, expenditures, or feasibility | The county argues timing condition legitimately limits nonconforming uses and prevents perpetual uncertainty | Held for Southern States: timing requirement is not a minimal condition and cannot be applied to divest preexisting rights |
| Whether prior court rulings and administrative certifications affect the constitutional analysis | Southern States contends the 1994 superior court ruling and subsequent county certifications confirm its vested right and show the one‑year rule cannot retroactively impair it | County contends later inactivity and application of Section 6.1.4 suffice to terminate the right | Court treats prior rulings as establishing the vested right and finds Section 6.1.4 nonetheless would retroactively impair it, so prior certifications do not validate the ordinance’s retroactive effect |
| Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Riverwood Farm on the constitutionality issue | Southern States argues summary judgment was erroneous because genuine issues exist and the ordinance, as applied, is unconstitutional | Riverwood Farm argues undisputed facts (nonuse for years) support applying Section 6.1.4 | Court reverses trial court: summary judgment for Riverwood Farm on this issue was erroneous because the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied |
Key Cases Cited
- Tilley Properties, Inc. v. Bartow County, 261 Ga. 153 (1991) (invalidated Bartow County’s pre‑1993 zoning ordinance)
- DeKalb County v. State of Ga., 270 Ga. 776 (1999) (definition and limits on retrospective operation of laws)
- Recycle & Recover, Inc. v. Georgia Bd. of Natural Resources, 266 Ga. 253 (1996) (zoning/regulatory enactments may not retroactively impair vested rights)
- Hayes v. Howell, 251 Ga. 580 (1983) (distinguishes permissible minimal conditions on vested rights)
- Michiels v. Fulton County, 261 Ga. 395 (1991) (zoning is an exercise of the police power subject to constitutional limits)