Southerland v. City of New York
680 F.3d 127
| 2d Cir. | 2012Background
- Southerland and Diane Manning are unrelated parties; Ciara Manning is Southerland's daughter, living away from his home, while other children (the Manning Children) live with Diane.
- ACS caseworker Woo investigated a school report about Ciara, misidentifying which children resided with Southerland, and sought a Home Entry Order under NY Family Court Act § 1034(2).
- The Family Court issued an Order Authorizing Entry, listing Ciara and the Manning Children but not all Southerland Children; Woo entered the apartment with officers on June 9, 1997 and removed six Southerland Children to a shelter.
- Subsequent investigations and petitions alleged abuse and neglect; a 1998 Family Court trial found Southerland had engaged in excessive corporal punishment and Ciara was sexually abused by him; these findings occurred after removal.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Woo on several grounds, including qualified immunity, while allowing others to proceed; the Second Circuit vacated and remanded certain Fourth Amendment and due-process claims for further proceedings.
- On appeal, the court affirms Southerland’s substantive due process claim but vacates and remands regarding the Southerland Children’s Fourth Amendment seizure and search claims and related procedural due-process claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether corrected-affidavit doctrine bars liability | Southerland argues the district court erred by applying the corrected-affidavit doctrine to immunize Woo. | Woo contends corrected information still supports probable cause. | Vacate; disputed facts remain; doctrine not dispositive. |
| Whether Woo knowingly or recklessly misstated facts | Plaintiffs assert Woo lied or acted with reckless disregard in the June 6 application. | Woo maintained statements were not knowingly false. | Genuine issues of material fact exist; summary judgment vacated. |
| Procedural due process in child removal without court order | Removal proceeded without timely court order, violating procedural due process. | Emergency circumstances or time pressures could justify removal; post-removal hearing provided. | Remand; district court erred in granting immunity; not all facts clarify timing of post-removal proceedings. |
| Substantive due process and the risk to parental rights | Removal was egregious and shockingly arbitrary to violate substantive due process. | Brief removals to protect children may be constitutional where supported by evidence and post-removal proceedings. | Southerland's substantive due process claim affirmed as to Woo; district court’s merits reversed on this point; see opinion for scope. |
| Fourth Amendment unlawful-seizure claim by the Southerland Children | Removal without imminent danger or court order was an unreasonable seizure. | Standards evolving; reliance on emergency/exigent circumstances or probable cause may justify seizure. | Qualified immunity not clearly established on current record; merits require further development; remand directed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999) (redefines child-removal due-process framework; informs seizure standards)
- Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 2000) (procedural due process and child-removal rights; informs 'emergency' analysis)
- Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1991) (emergency circumstances for removal without court order)
- Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (foundational discussion of family-court intervention; due process)
- Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (procedural due process in child-removal; timing of predeprivation process)
- Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999) (substantive balance between parental rights and child protection; reasonable-basis standard)
- Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1987) (emergency-exigency considerations in child-protective actions)
- Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 115 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (corrected-affidavit doctrine and probable-cause framework)
- Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) (probable cause and corrected-affidavit considerations)