South v. Lujan, 336 P.3d 1000

Background

Tiffany South, a non‑Indian former Sandia Pueblo police officer, sued three Sandia Pueblo employees (one Indian chief, one non‑Indian captain, and one non‑Indian HR manager) in their individual capacities for sexual harassment, retaliation, and tortious interference. Sandia Pueblo itself was not named.
Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 1‑012(B)(1) and (2) (lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction / tribal sovereign immunity) and Rule 1‑019 (failure to join a necessary party). The district court granted dismissal with prejudice.
The legality of state‑court jurisdiction depended on facts: where the conduct occurred (on or off reservation), whether defendants acted within the scope of Pueblo employment, and whether the Pueblo is a necessary party or would be affected by adjudication.
The district court made no factual findings, no hearing transcript was in the record, and the parties did not develop the factual record on these jurisdictional matters.
The Court of Appeals held the record insufficient to review the jurisdictional dismissal, reversed, and remanded for factual development on issues bearing on state‑court jurisdiction and tribal immunity.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether state court has subject‑matter jurisdiction over claims involving tribal employees	South argued claims were against individuals (some actions outside scope of employment) and NMHRA and tort claims should proceed in state court	Defendants argued NMHRA doesn’t apply to the Pueblo or its employees, sovereign immunity bars suit, and the Pueblo is a necessary party	Court: Record lacks factual findings to resolve; remanded for factual development before jurisdictional ruling can be reviewed
Whether defendants acted within scope of Pueblo employment (affects immunity and infringement analysis)	South alternatively pled conduct both inside and outside scope; relied in part on principle that supervisor sexual harassment often is outside scope	Defendants asserted defendants acted in managerial capacity and were acting in that capacity when South was discharged	Court: Material factual dispute and no findings below — remand required for fact‑finding
Whether Pueblo sovereign immunity bars suit (is suit really against the Pueblo?)	South contended claims targeted individuals and NMHRA should permit suit against individuals	Defendants contended a judgment would effectively be against the Pueblo and thus barred by sovereign immunity	Court: Whether suit is effectively against the Pueblo depends on unresolved facts (scope, whether tribal assets or governance implicated); remand required
Whether state adjudication would impermissibly infringe tribal sovereignty (Williams infringement test)	South emphasized individual capacity claims and disputed that tribal self‑government would be affected	Defendants argued litigation intrudes on Pueblo’s interest in running its police department and enforcing employment policies	Court: Application of infringement test requires factual development (identity of parties, location of conduct, nature of interests); remand ordered

Key Cases Cited

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (establishes the infringement test for state jurisdiction over matters involving Indians)
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (explains tribes’ self‑government interest and limits of state power)
Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir.) (distinguishes facial vs factual attacks on subject‑matter jurisdiction; allows court to weigh evidence in factual attacks)
In re Begay, 107 N.M. 810 (N.M. Ct. App.) (remand for factual findings where jurisdiction hinges on unresolved facts)
Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 132 N.M. 207 (N.M.) (scope of necessary‑party joinder and tribal interests depend on facts)
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (discusses when supervisor sexual harassment is outside scope of employment)
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (identifies when a suit is effectively against a sovereign)