South Florida Racing Ass'n v. State, Department of Business & Professional Regulation
201 So. 3d 57
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- SFRA (Hialeah Park, Miami‑Dade) sought to trigger §550.0745(1) by claiming it had the smallest pari‑mutuel "play or total pool within the county" for the two prior fiscal years and thus could convert or create a summer jai alai permit.
- Division counted only wagers physically placed in Miami‑Dade (live on‑track and intertrack bets placed at in‑county guest tracks); SFRA counted all wagers credited to its pool, including intertrack wagers placed out‑of‑county.
- For 2012/2013, parties stipulated: SFRA — $1,244,845 live + $218,998 intertrack = $1,463,843; West Flagler — $893,173 live + $1,047,328 intertrack = $1,940,501. All intertrack wagers were placed at guest tracks outside Miami‑Dade.
- Division denied SFRA’s application, concluding "total pool within the county" means only wagers physically placed in the county; SFRA administratively challenged and appealed.
- The court reviewed statutory meaning, legislative history (including 1980 enactment whereas clauses), and chapter 550 usage of "total pool," and concluded the Division’s interpretation was clearly erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "smallest play or total pool within the county" limits the applicant's "total pool" to wagers physically placed within the county | SFRA: "total pool" covers all monies wagered credited to the permittee (including out‑of‑county intertrack wagers); "within the county" only identifies the universe of permittees for comparison | Division: "within the county" limits calculation to wagers physically placed in that county (live on‑track and intertrack placed at in‑county guest tracks) | Court: Reversed — "total pool" includes all wagers credited to a permittee; "within the county" refers to which permittees are compared, not where wagers were placed |
Key Cases Cited
- Donato v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 767 So. 2d 1146 (agency construction of statute entitled to great deference)
- Mayo Clinic Jacksonville v. Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 625 So. 2d 918 (agency interpretations not dispositive when inconsistent with statutory meaning)
- Summer Jai Alai Partners v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Div. of Pari‑Mutuel Wagering, 125 So. 3d 304 (agency deference limits applied where no special expertise required)
- Fla. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 823 So. 2d 844 (no deference when agency interpretation conflicts with plain meaning)
- Fla. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cooper, 858 So. 2d 394 (agency interpretation is clearly erroneous if unreasonable)
- Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Sanford‑Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879 (chapter 550 legislative purpose: revenue generation)
- Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 245 So. 2d 625 (state revenue is a prime factor in permitting pari‑mutuel wagering)