SOUTH ALLEGHENY PITTSBURGH RESTAURANT ENTERPRISES, LLC v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, 2:16-cv-01393

Background

Plaintiff South Allegheny Pittsburgh Restaurant Enterprises, LLC (Mother Fletcher’s) opened an under‑21 dance club at 2200 E. Carson St. and ran a grand opening on Sept. 3–4, 2016 advertising parties, dancing, and DJ events; no zoning approvals to permit dancing/entertainment were sought.
The property’s 1984 zoning special exception authorized a first‑floor restaurant with a condition of no live entertainment; City zoning officials concluded the new operation exceeded that permitted use.
PLI and Police conducted a compliance visit in the early morning of Sept. 4, 2016; PLI posted Stop Work Order / Cease Operations notices directing the business to cease and to obtain required approvals.
Plaintiff filed a § 1983 complaint and moved for a TRO/preliminary injunction seeking immediate reopening while litigating zoning rights in federal court.
At the evidentiary hearing the Court found Plaintiff’s evidence that the venue was a bona fide restaurant insufficient and credited City witnesses; Plaintiff had not appealed the Stop Work Order to the Zoning Board nor sought a variance/special exemption.
The Court denied injunctive relief and sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 due process claims without prejudice as unripe under Third Circuit finality/ripeness doctrine.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ripeness / finality of § 1983 challenge to zoning enforcement	Firman: Order defective and issued without required emergency showing; federal court may enjoin now so business can reopen pending zoning appeal	City: Plaintiff must first pursue available local remedies (appeal to Zoning Board, apply for special exemption/variance); claims premature	Court: Claims unripe; final decision by Zoning Board required; dismissal without prejudice
Adequacy/form of Stop Work Order as appealable determination	Plaintiff: Order insufficiently formal to trigger right/ability to appeal (no citation/violation notice)	City: Even informal orders or oral communications can be appealable; PLI communicated reasons and corrective steps	Court: Form did not prevent application of finality rule; order and accompanying communications were appealable
Emergency provision / procedural compliance under Zoning Code § 924.05.B	Plaintiff: Shutdown required an emergency and code procedures were not followed; provision vague	City: Code authorizes stop work where permits/uses violate Code; Director discretion to act on emergency; alternative enforcement provisions exist	Court: Procedural irregularities do not defeat finality requirement; Board must interpret terms like “emergency” first
Need for zoning application (variance/special exception) before federal relief	Plaintiff: Contends operation was a restaurant and thus permitted; seeks to litigate constitutionality now	City: Regardless, dancing/live entertainment requires Zoning Board approval (special exemption/variance)	Court: Even assuming restaurant label disputed, zoning change/Board approval necessary before federal adjudication

Key Cases Cited

Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285 (3d Cir.) (boards must render final decision before federal constitutional challenge)
Elsmere Park Club, L.P. v. Town of Elsmere, 542 F.3d 412 (3d Cir.) (post‑deprivation procedures must be exhausted; ripeness/finality rule)
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (U.S. 1985) (federal takings/finality principles requiring state procedures)
Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 (3d Cir.) (district courts should not act as super zoning boards)
Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645 (3d Cir.) (purpose of preliminary injunction is to maintain status quo)
K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99 (3d Cir.) (four‑factor preliminary injunction standard)
Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700 (3d Cir.) (definition of status quo in injunction context)