Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757

Background

Eric Sousa and Donna Sousa divorced in 2001; their separation agreement (incorporated into the decree) divided Sousa’s police pension equally and provided time‑limited alimony.
After Donna cohabited, the parties agreed (circa 2004) that she would waive her pension share in exchange for continued alimony for three years; in 2007 they signed a stipulation to modify the 2001 decree and Judge Resha accepted and made it a final order.
Donna, appearing pro se in 2007, was canvassed by the judge and affirmed she understood and consented to the stipulation; no appeal was taken from that order.
In 2011 Donna moved to vacate the 2007 order first on fraud grounds and later claiming the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the property distribution; the trial court denied both motions in 2014.
The Appellate Court reversed as to the jurisdictional claim, holding it was “entirely obvious” under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b‑81 and 46b‑86(a) that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify property distributions post‑dissolution and therefore remanded to vacate the 2007 order.
The Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the Appellate Court: it held it was not "entirely obvious" that Judge Resha lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that finality considerations bar a collateral attack on the 2007 modification; the case was remanded for the Appellate Court to address Donna’s fraud claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Sousa)	Defendant's Argument (Sousa)	Held
Whether Judge Resha lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the pension distribution in 2007	The Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction; it was not "entirely obvious" Resha lacked jurisdiction and the modification should stand	§ 46b‑86(a) and § 46b‑81 deprive the court of continuing jurisdiction to modify property distributions post‑dissolution, so Resha’s order was void	Not entirely obvious that Resha lacked jurisdiction; the Appellate Court erred in so concluding
Whether a collateral attack on the 2007 order is permissible under finality doctrines (Vogel/Restatement §12)	Finality, consent, canvass, age of the order, and opportunity to litigate jurisdiction counsel against collateral attack	Even if not timely, a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked when lack of jurisdiction is "entirely obvious"	Collateral attack disallowed: defendant had opportunity to litigate, agreed to the stipulation, and policy favors finality; collateral attack not permitted here
Whether the § 46b‑86(a) limitation is a jurisdictional bar or a limit on statutory authority	Argues ambiguity in case law; Amodio and the court’s plenary family jurisdiction counsel treating §46b‑86(a) as authority, not absolute jurisdictional bar	Many authorities treat §46b‑86(a) as jurisdictional, barring postdissolution property modifications	Court finds conflict in precedent; because law is not settled, it is not "entirely obvious" that jurisdiction was lacking
Whether Broaca remains controlling precedent that permits collateral attack where action is plainly beyond jurisdiction	Plaintiff contends Broaca was an outlier and should be overruled consistent with Restatement §12 and Vogel	Defendant relies on Broaca and like cases to argue the 2007 order was plainly beyond jurisdiction and therefore void	Broaca overruled to extent it conflicted with Vogel/Restatement §12; the majority adopts a stricter, rare‑case standard for collateral attacks

Key Cases Cited

Vogel v. Vogel, 178 Conn. 358 (Conn. 1979) (establishes collateral‑attack limit: only where lack of subject matter jurisdiction is "entirely obvious")
Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173 (Conn. 1979) (discusses finality and limits on collateral attacks)
Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724 (Conn. 1999) (distinguishes subject matter jurisdiction from statutory authority in family matters)
Broaca v. Broaca, 181 Conn. 463 (Conn. 1980) (previously permitted collateral attack where court acted plainly beyond jurisdiction; majority here rejects that approach)
In re Shamika F., 256 Conn. 383 (Conn. 2001) (applies Vogel factors and explains when collateral attack may be barred)
Investment Assocs. v. Summit Assocs., Inc., 309 Conn. 840 (Conn. 2013) (reaffirms vitality of Restatement §12 and finality principles)
Urban Redevelopment Comm'n v. Katsetos, 86 Conn.App. 236 (Conn. App. 2004) (enumerates finality/equitable factors to consider when lack of jurisdiction is not "entirely obvious")