Soules v. Town of Oxford
669 F. App'x 54
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Gary Soules, a Town of Oxford police officer, sued the Town, First Selectman George R. Temple, and Sargent Daniel Semosky alleging work-related disability discrimination and related claims after injuries/PTSD.
- Soules asserted federal claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, USERRA (against Temple and the Town), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against Temple and Semosky individually for substantive due process), plus Connecticut state-law claims: CFEPA (disability discrimination) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- The District Court dismissed five claims with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), finding Soules failed to plead that his PTSD/injury substantially impaired major life activities and that his pleadings were not comprehensible under Twombly/Iqbal.
- Soules did not timely seek leave to amend a second time; the District Court denied further amendment as futile. Soules raised that argument for the first time on appeal.
- The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the ADA/Rehab Act, USERRA, and § 1983 claims, and found denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion (futility and failure to request amendment).
- The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the dismissals of the state-law CFEPA and IIED claims, instructing the District Court to dismiss them without prejudice because the District Court had effectively declined supplemental jurisdiction but nevertheless entered merits dismissals with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Soules alleged a disability under ADA/Rehab Act | Soules claimed PTSD/injury constituted actual or perceived disability | Defendants argued complaint lacked facts showing impairment of major life activities or plausible allegations | Court: Affirmed dismissal — complaint failed to plausibly allege disability or meet Twombly/Iqbal standards |
| Whether Soules adequately pleaded USERRA claim (against Temple/Town) | Soules asserted statutory protection for service-related employment issues | Defendants argued pleading deficiencies and limited official-capacity claims; Soules had withdrawn official-capacity claims on appeal | Court: Affirmed dismissal — pleading deficient and cannot add USERRA claim against Semosky now |
| Whether Soules should have been allowed to amend complaint again | Soules argued he should have opportunity to file a third amended complaint | Defendants argued Soules never requested leave to amend and prior amendment failed to cure defects | Court: Affirmed denial — Soules never sought leave and further amendment would be futile; appellate argument frivolous |
| Whether District Court properly disposed of state-law claims (CFEPA, IIED) | Soules challenged dismissal with prejudice of state-law claims | Defendants argued merits dismissal was appropriate | Court: Vacated and remanded — District Court had declined supplemental jurisdiction but still dismissed state claims with prejudice; must dismiss them without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002) (Rule 12(b)(6) review standards)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not entitled to assumption of truth)
- Hutchison v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 647 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2011) (standards for reviewing denial of leave to amend; futility review de novo)
- Williams v. Citigroup Inc., 659 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2011) (failure to seek amendment below makes appellate complaint frivolous)
- Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2006) (factors for exercising supplemental jurisdiction)
- Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) (considerations for declining supplemental jurisdiction)