Soto v. Gaudett, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11939

Background

In the early morning of Jan. 23, 2008, Bridgeport police pursued a stolen Toyota Camry; three occupants fled when the car stopped in a park. One occupant (Soto) ran and was pursued on foot by officers.
Robinson’s cruiser collided with Soto as Soto ran across a street; Soto was knocked down, hit his head, got up, and continued running.
Officer Csech tased Soto from behind while Soto was fleeing. After Soto fell and was entangled in taser wires, Officers Stepniewski and Robinson each deployed tasers at close range as Soto attempted to rise. Soto became unresponsive and suffered catastrophic brain injuries.
Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force (taser deployments and the vehicle collision) and alleged municipal liability against the City and Chief Gaudett; district court denied summary judgment on most claims.
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered whether (a) taser use on a fleeing suspect was constitutionally prohibited/clearly established, (b) the subsequent tasings were excessive once Soto was down, (c) Robinson’s vehicle contact was accidental, and (d) the City/Gaudett were entitled to immunity or summary judgment on municipal claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Csech’s tasing of Soto while Soto was fleeing violated a clearly established right	Soto argues the taser deployment was excessive force	Csech argues tasing a fleeing suspect was not clearly unlawful and was objectively reasonable	Court: Csech entitled to qualified immunity; no clearly established right precluding tasing a fleeing suspect as of Jan. 23, 2008 (summary judgment reversed in Csech’s favor)
Whether Stepniewski and Robinson were entitled to qualified immunity for taser deployments after Soto fell	Soto contends the later tasings were against a non-threatening, incapacitated individual	Officers contend they reasonably believed Soto still posed flight/threat risk; tasings were lawful	Court: evidence (viewed for plaintiff) leaves triable issues whether Soto was non-threatening and on ground when tased; denial of summary judgment not immediately appealable (appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)
Whether Robinson’s cruiser striking Soto was an accidental non-seizure or an intentional use of force	Soto alleges the vehicle struck him (excessive force)	Robinson asserts the contact was accidental; accidental contact is not a Fourth Amendment seizure	Court: genuine credibility disputes exist about intentionality; denial of summary judgment not immediately appealable (appeal dismissed)
Whether the City and Chief Gaudett are entitled to qualified immunity on municipal liability claims	Soto alleges municipal policy/practice and training failures caused the violations	City/Gaudett argue no established constitutional violation and insist on qualified-immunity protection	Court: qualified immunity doctrine does not apply to municipalities or official-capacity claims; appeals dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction

Key Cases Cited

O'Bert ex rel. Estate of O'Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003) (courts must critically assess officers' accounts when victim cannot contradict them)
Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2010) (use of significant non-lethal force against a non-threatening or restrained suspect can violate the Fourth Amendment)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (reasonableness of force judged by totality of circumstances, including flight and threat)
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (Fourth Amendment seizure requires intentional governmental termination of movement)
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity)
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (immediate appealability of denial of qualified immunity when it presents substantial legal question)
Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standards; credibility and evidence weighing are jury functions)