Soto-Cosme v. United States
320 F. Supp. 3d 350
United States District Court2018Background
- Soto‑Cosme pleaded guilty in 2007 to multiple counts arising from two bank robberies, including charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (use/brandishing of a firearm) and § 2113 (bank robbery). He was sentenced to 358 months; the First Circuit affirmed.
- In 2016 he filed a § 2255 motion seeking to vacate his § 924(c) conviction after Johnson v. United States, arguing the § 924(c) residual clause is void for vagueness and that bank robbery (and aiding/abetting it) is not a "crime of violence."
- He argued § 2113(a)’s alternative mens rea of "intimidation" could criminalize non‑forceful conduct, so federal bank robbery does not categorically meet § 924(c)(3)(A)’s force‑clause requirement.
- He also argued aiding and abetting a bank robbery cannot be a crime of violence because an aider need not personally apply force.
- Separately, he claimed a sentencing enhancement in one case was improper and that he lacked notice to object; that claim was raised after the § 2255 one‑year limitations period.
Issues
| Issue | Soto‑Cosme's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2113 federal bank robbery is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) | § 2113 can be committed by "intimidation" without physical force, so it does not categorically have as an element the use/threat of physical force | First Circuit precedent holds § 2113 necessarily involves threatened or actual physical force; intimidation implies a threat of bodily harm | Court held § 2113 is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A); § 924(c) conviction stands |
| Whether aiding and abetting a § 2113 offense is a "crime of violence" | Aider may not personally use force, so aiding/abetting lacks the required force element | Under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and binding precedent, aider is punished as principal and is responsible for principal's violent acts | Court held aiding and abetting a § 2113 robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) |
| Whether the § 924(c) residual clause (924(c)(3)(B)) must be resolved (void for vagueness) | Johnson voids residual clause, so § 924(c) conviction should be vacated if predicate relies on residual clause | No need to reach residual‑clause vagueness because the predicate qualifies under the force clause | Court did not resolve void‑for‑vagueness claim; declined relief because force clause applies |
| Whether sentencing enhancement (five‑level) based on dismissed count was timely and reviewable | Enhancement was improper and petitioner had no advance notice or chance to object | Claim is untimely under § 2255(f)(1); unrelated to Johnson‑based relief window | Claim is time‑barred and DENIED |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ellison, 866 F.3d 32 (1st Cir.) (§ 2113 qualifies as a crime of violence under a force‑clause analysis)
- Hunter v. United States, 873 F.3d 388 (1st Cir.) (extends Ellison to hold § 2113 is a § 924(c) predicate under the force clause)
- United States v. Torres‑Miguel, 701 F.3d 165 (4th Cir.) (categorical‑approach framework for assessing least culpable conduct)
- United States v. Mitchell, 23 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (aiding and abetting is punished as a principal; aider shares principal's acts)
- United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (rejects reliance on fanciful hypotheticals when applying the categorical approach)
- Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (Sup. Ct.) (§ 2255 provides relief for sentences imposed in violation of the Constitution or law)
- Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636 (1st Cir.) (procedural standards for § 2255 relief)