Sorenson v. Felton
793 N.W.2d 799
| N.D. | 2011Background
- Sorenson filed a complaint to quiet title to minerals on May 20, 2008 in Mountrail County.
- Felton held an interest in the disputed minerals via a 1984 personal representative deed.
- Sorenson published notices of lapse in January 2007 after Felton had not used or claimed the minerals.
- Sorenson sent notice to Felton at a Florida address listed on the deed; Felton’s current address was unknown to Sorenson.
- Schmitz Oil Properties later located Felton in California; Felton entered a lease in January 2008 and recorded a claim in February 2008.
- The district court quieted title in Felton in July 2010; Sorenson appeals seeking title in Sorenson.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether pre-2007 § 38-18.1-06(2) requires a reasonable inquiry when an address is shown of record. | Sorenson: address shown of record means no reasonable inquiry required. | Felton: a reasonable inquiry is required regardless of a record address. | No reasonable inquiry required if address is shown of record. |
| Does the word 'or' in § 38-18.1-06(2) create separate grounds for notice? | Sorenson: 'shown of record' and 'determined upon reasonable inquiry' are independent options. | Felton: the phrases are interpreted to support inquiry in all cases. | Yes; 'shown of record' and 'determined upon reasonable inquiry' are disjunctive and independent. |
| Did Sorenson’s notice comply with the statutory requirements given Felton’s address appeared of record? | Sorenson argues compliance due to record address. | Felton argues record address must be correct and current. | Notice was sufficient where Felton’s record address was shown, so no further inquiry was required. |
| Should the 2007 and 2009 amendments to § 38-18.1-06 affect this pre-amendment case? | The amendments clarify procedures but are not retroactive. | Amendments could alter applicable procedures. | Amendments not retroactive; governing law is pre-amendment. |
| What is the resulting ownership of abandoned minerals where notice requirements were satisfied? | If abandonment triggers apply, surface owner may claim. | Felton contends different outcomes based on address notice issues. | The surface owner is entitled to abandon minerals if timely notice is properly given per statute. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sauby v. Fargo, 2008 ND 60 (2008 ND) (statutory interpretation and reliance on plain language aided by extrinsic aids when ambiguous)
- Amerada Hess Corp. v. State ex rel. Tax Comm’r, 2005 ND 155 (2005 ND) (interpretation of statutory language and legislative intent)
- Wheeler v. Gardner, 2006 ND 24 (2006 ND) (statutory interpretation framework)
- Douville v. Pembina County Water Res. Dist., 2000 ND 124 (2000 ND) (principles of textual interpretation and legislative intent)
- State v. Hansen, 2006 ND 139 (2006 ND) (avoidance of advisory opinions; proper statutory construction)
- Ness v. St. Aloisius Hospital, 313 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 1981) (statutory interpretation principles (historical reference))
- State v. Laib, 2002 ND 95 (2002 ND) (meaning of words and sentences in statutory context)
- Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965) (separation of powers; court cannot legislate)