Soojung Jang v. Trs. of St. Johnsbury Acad.
331 F. Supp. 3d 312
D. Vt.2018Background
- Plaintiff Soojung Jang, a South Korea resident and member of a Jeju education subcommittee, alleges a July 12, 2016 letter from counsel for St. Johnsbury Academy and Kingdom Development Co. (KDC) to the Jeju Governor is libelous and sought her removal from the subcommittee.
- The Academy and KDC were parties to a cooperative venture to establish St. Johnsbury Academy–Jeju (SJA‑Jeju); disputes arose over their business relationship and disclosures, and several media reports and inquiry letters circulated before and after the Letter.
- The Letter criticized Jang’s conduct (calling it unauthorized, disruptive, false, and an effort to scuttle the project) and relied on an independent NAIS lawyer review and other investigative events.
- Defendants moved to strike under Vermont’s anti‑SLAPP statute (12 V.S.A. § 1041) and moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Jang opposed both motions.
- The court applied Vermont law (parties implicitly consented), held First Amendment protections could apply extraterritorially here, denied the anti‑SLAPP motion because the Letter did not sufficiently involve a "public issue," but granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion because Jang failed to plausibly plead falsity, lack of privilege, or constitutional fault.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Choice of law / extraterritorial First Amendment | Jang suggested South Korean law might apply | Defs relied on Vermont law and U.S. First Amendment protections | Court applied Vermont law by implied consent and held First Amendment protections may apply extraterritorially here |
| Anti‑SLAPP (whether Letter concerned a "public issue") | Jang: Letter addressed private grievance in Korea, not public issue | Defs: Letter was petitioning government on matter tied to SJA‑Jeju and public interest | Motion to strike denied — defendants failed to show Letter was connected to a public issue under Vermont/Felis standard |
| Defamation — falsity, opinion, specificity | Jang: Letter maliciously called her statements unauthorized, disruptive, false | Defs: Letter contains opinion/mixed statements and relied on reasonable factual bases; privilege and truth defenses apply | Dismissed — complaint failed to identify specific false statements and, on its face, admits conduct underlying Letter; substantial truth and opinion bar claim |
| Defamation / privilege and constitutional fault (negligence/actual malice) & tortious interference | Jang: alleged malice, interference with professional relationship | Defs: communications were privileged to protect business interests; no negligence or actual malice pled | Dismissed — conditional privilege not plausibly negated; complaint lacks factual allegations of negligence or malice; interference claim fails for same reasons |
Key Cases Cited
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974) (state defamation liability must include a fault requirement beyond strict liability)
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (First Amendment limits on defamation law concerning public officials)
- Felis v. Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, 200 Vt. 465 (Vt. 2015) (Vermont Supreme Court narrowly construes § 1041 and requires a "public issue" connection for anti‑SLAPP protection)
- Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ., 734 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2013) (Second Circuit decision discussing extraterritorial publication contexts and public interest in university‑related disputes)
- Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (balancing extraterritorial First Amendment protection against foreign law and foreign‑policy considerations)
- Tannerite Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal News Grp., 864 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2017) (plaintiff must plead allegedly defamatory statements with sufficient specificity)