Sonya Kay Hargett v. State
06-15-00022-CR
| Tex. Crim. App. | Jul 28, 2015Background
- Appellant Sonya Kay Hargett faced a probation revocation hearing after alleged use of controlled substances/alcohol in violation of probation terms.
- At the hearing, the State introduced drug test results and expert testimony from lab analyst Tommy Thompson, based on urine samples collected by probation.
- Defense objected that the forensic analysis and expert testimony were inadmissible because the testing lab was not shown to be DPS-accredited and Article 38.35 (Tex. Code Crim. Proc.) restricts admissibility of forensic analyses in criminal actions.
- The State argued Article 38.35 does not apply to probation revocation hearings because revocations are administrative (not "criminal actions"), and alternatively that an express exception in Art. 38.35(a)(4)(E) covered the testing (presumptive tests for community-supervision compliance or tests conducted under contract with supervision departments).
- The State further argued (1) the testing being confirmatory rather than merely presumptive does not negate admissibility and (2) an implied contract existed between the lab and probation based on the lab’s performance and billing, and probation participated in sample collection.
- The State conceded that if the Court finds Art. 38.35 applies and the lab was not DPS-accredited with no applicable exception, the evidence would be excluded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Hargett) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Art. 38.35 applies to probation revocation hearings | Revocations are administrative "other matters" not covered by the statute, so Art. 38.35 does not bar evidence | Art. 38.35 applies and bars forensic analysis from non‑accredited labs | Court's ruling urged: overrule objection; evidence admissible (State asks affirmance) |
| Whether Art. 38.35(a)(4)(E) exception applies | Testing was for compliance with community supervision, done by/under contract with probation; collection by probation bolsters exception | Argues testing was confirmatory (not presumptive) and no contract was shown | State contends exception applies; Court urged to admit evidence under exception |
| Whether confirmatory testing defeats the Art. 38.35(a)(4)(E) exception | Confirmatory testing is more reliable than presumptive and should not bar application of the exception | Exception limited to presumptive tests; confirmatory testing falls outside | State argues higher reliability favors admissibility; Court invited to accept that confirmatory testing is covered |
| Whether lack of DPS accreditation requires exclusion under Art. 38.35(d) | If Art. 38.35 does not apply or exception fits, accreditation not required; alternatively, an implied contract and probation participation satisfy exceptions | Lab lacked shown DPS accreditation; therefore evidence must be excluded | State conceded no proof of accreditation; if court finds statute applies without exception, evidence must be excluded |
Key Cases Cited
- Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App. 1991) (statutory interpretation focuses on text to discern legislative intent)
- Harris v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (principles for construing criminal statutes)
- Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. App. 2014) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- Hill v. State, 480 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (probation revocation hearings are administrative in nature)
- Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (probation revocation characterized as non‑criminal/administrative)
- United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970) (authority treating revocation as administrative)
- Ishin Speed Sport, Inc. v. Rutherford, 933 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App. 1996) (implied‑contract principles apply where parties’ conduct demonstrates agreement)
- Smith v. Renz, 840 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App. 1992) (similar discussion of implied contracts)