Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp 215 v. City of Memphis, W2017-00665-COA-R3-CV

Background

In 2013 the Memphis City Council passed a resolution renaming three parks: Confederate Park, Jefferson Davis Park, and Nathan Bedford Forrest Park (Forrest Park). Forrest Park had been named by ordinance in 1899.
Plaintiffs (Sons of Confederate Veterans, Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp #215 — SCV) sued seeking a declaratory judgment that the renaming resolution was ultra vires and invalid; SCV alleged injury from removal of a granite marker they funded and placed in Forrest Park.
The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and denied SCV’s motion, holding the City Charter authorized the Council to act by resolution regarding park administration and that the renaming was not ultra vires.
On appeal SCV argued (inter alia) the renaming was a "permanent" municipal action requiring an ordinance under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-54-512; that an ordinance (Forrest Park’s 1899 naming) can only be repealed by an act of equal dignity; that delegation to a parks administrative division precluded the Council’s unilateral action; and that the Mayor’s consent could not cure procedural defects.
The Court of Appeals affirmed: it found SCV had standing for this appeal, held the 2013 renamings were not shown to be "permanent" under § 6-54-512 on the undisputed facts, and concluded the Memphis City Charter (a Private Act) expressly permitted the Council to act by resolution with respect to park administration, so the equal-dignity rule did not invalidate the resolution.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether renaming parks is a "permanent" municipal action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-54-512	Renaming is permanent and therefore must be by ordinance	The record shows the Council intended interim names and a committee would select permanent names; renaming here was not permanent	Not permanent on undisputed facts; statute not violated
Whether an ordinance (Forrest Park 1899) can be repealed or altered other than by ordinance (equal-dignity doctrine)	An ordinance can only be repealed/altered by an act of equal dignity (i.e., another ordinance)	Memphis City Charter grants Council power to act by ordinance or resolution regarding parks, so the Charter supplies equal-or-greater dignity	Charter authorized Council to act by resolution; equal-dignity rule does not invalidate the resolution
Whether delegation to Park Commission / Division of Park Services prevents Council action without repealing delegation ordinance	Delegation vested exclusive administrative control in the parks division, so Council cannot act on park administration by resolution	Charter reserves Council authority to act "from time to time" by resolution or ordinance over park administration; ordinances cannot override charter	Council retained authority under Charter § 579.1; delegation did not preclude Council action
Whether Mayor’s consent/ratification can cure defects in Council action	(Argued by SCV that Mayor’s consent cannot cure procedural defects)	Mayor Wharton ratified and consented to the renaming	Court did not need to decide because Charter independently authorized Council action; Mayor’s consent was pretermitted
Standing to challenge resolution	SCV: had concrete injury from marker removal and collaboration with City	City: argued insufficient evidence at summary judgment to establish standing	Court held SCV had standing; City did not carry burden to obtain summary judgment on standing

Key Cases Cited

City of Bluff City v. Morrell, 764 S.W.2d 200 (Tenn. 1988) (annexation ordinance could not be rescinded by motion; repeal must be by act of equal dignity)
City of Lebanon v. Baird, 756 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. 1988) (municipal acts ultra vires when outside charter or not done consistent with mandatory charter provisions; charter may prescribe mode of action)
Wilgus v. City of Murfreesboro, 532 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (city ordinances are subordinate to charter provisions)
State ex rel. Schaltenbrand v. City of Knoxville, 788 S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (application of equal-dignity concept following Morrell)
Sandford v. Pearson, 231 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. 1950) (discussion of validity of Private Acts and their relation to general statutes)