Sonja Faith Moffett v. David Jemmott Jr
330900
| Mich. Ct. App. | Jun 8, 2017Background
- Oakland County filed a paternity action in Michigan against Jemmott (resident of Virginia), alleging he was the father of a child living in Oakland County; summons and complaint were served on Jemmott in Virginia by certified mail.
- Plaintiff moved for default after Jemmott did not initially respond; notice given that a default judgment would be entered without a hearing.
- After the default motion, Jemmott signed a genetic testing order (sent by the prosecutor) that: required him to submit to DNA testing, made results admissible in Michigan, stated Michigan law (Paternity Act) would apply, and provided a default judgment/child support order would remain in effect.
- Jemmott also sent a letter requesting genetic testing and asking the matter be continued or returned to Virginia.
- The trial court found personal jurisdiction, entered a default judgment of filiation and child support, and later denied Jemmott’s motion to set aside the default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding he waived jurisdictional objection by signing the genetic testing order.
- Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Jemmott’s execution of the genetic-testing order constituted a general appearance under the UIFSA and waived contest to personal jurisdiction; court noted availability of modification relief for changed circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant’s signing of the genetic testing order constituted a general appearance/waiver of personal jurisdiction under UIFSA | Moffett: signing the order and requesting testing show awareness and intent to appear and submit to Michigan jurisdiction | Jemmott: he did not consent to Michigan jurisdiction and only sought testing; thus the court lacked personal jurisdiction | Yes. Signing the genetic testing order was a general appearance under MCL 552.1201(b) and waived a contest to personal jurisdiction |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying motion to set aside default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction | Moffett: no abuse; jurisdiction was waived | Jemmott: the judgment should be set aside because Michigan lacked in personam jurisdiction over him | No abuse of discretion; denial affirmed |
| Whether defendant has remedy if default orders do not reflect current ability to pay | Moffett: defendant may seek modification under applicable statutes/case law | Jemmott: argued default order was improper and should be vacated instead of modified | Court: modification motion is available (Lemmen; MCL 552.517b(8)) |
| Proper standard of review for personal jurisdiction determination on appeal | Plaintiff: trial court’s factual findings supported denial of motion; law reviewed de novo | Defendant: appellate review should reverse if jurisdiction lacking | Court: personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo; applied law to facts and affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (consent and waived objections to personal jurisdiction can arise from party’s conduct)
- Nelson v. McCormick, 334 Mich. 387 (1951) (entry of a general appearance gives the court in personam jurisdiction)
- Ragnone v. Wirsing, 141 Mich. App. 263 (1985) (general-appearance inference requires knowledge of proceedings and intent to appear)
- Deeb v. Berri, 118 Mich. App. 556 (1982) (actions recognizing the case as in court, except timely objection to jurisdiction, constitute a general appearance)
- Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Inc., 246 Mich. App. 424 (2001) (distinguishes general and limited personal jurisdiction principles)
- Lemmen v. Lemmen, 481 Mich. 164 (2008) (trial court may modify child support orders when necessary)
- In re Dearmon, 303 Mich. App. 684 (2014) (personal-jurisdiction determinations reviewed de novo)
