Solomon v. State
303 Kan. 512
| Kan. | 2015Background
- Kansas amended its constitution in 1972 to vest “general administrative authority over all courts in this state” in the Kansas Supreme Court as part of creating a unified court system.
- Historically, the Supreme Court promulgated rules (Rule 107) appointing a chief judge in each judicial district with administrative authority; the legislature codified compatible statutes (K.S.A. 20-329) reflecting that practice.
- In 2014 the Legislature enacted H.B. 2338, §11 (K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-329), which replaced Supreme Court appointment with peer election of each district’s chief judge and required district rules for election; the bill included a nonseverability clause.
- Larry T. Solomon, the incumbent chief judge of the 30th Judicial District, sued for declaratory judgment challenging §11 as an unconstitutional encroachment on the Supreme Court’s administrative authority; district court granted Solomon summary judgment and struck H.B. 2338 (subject to a stay on part of that relief).
- Kansas Supreme Court affirmed: held Solomon had standing and §11 impermissibly interfered with the Supreme Court’s constitutionally vested administrative authority over the courts; Rule 107 remains in effect.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing / Justiciability | Solomon: §11 affects his rights/status as incumbent chief judge and forces him to choose between following Rule 107 or implementing a statutory election procedure, so declaratory relief is proper | State: Solomon may never lose his position; no concrete injury; claim not ripe | Solomon has a specific, personal, cognizable injury (administrative duty conflict); he has standing and the claim is ripe |
| Separation of powers — who appoints chief judges | Solomon: Appointment/assignment of chief judges is an administrative function integral to Supreme Court’s constitutional authority; legislature cannot reassign that power | State: Legislature can prescribe appointment procedures; this is administrative/legislative cooperation and does not strip Supreme Court of ultimate supervision | §11 unconstitutionally intrudes on the Supreme Court’s general administrative authority; statute invalid; Rule 107 controls |
| Scope of “general administrative authority” | Solomon: Phrase includes rulemaking and appointment/assignment power necessary to unify courts and prevent fragmentation | State: Authority is not exclusive; legislature may act to govern administration subject to supervision | Court construed the constitutional phrase in light of history and voters’ intent to include appointment/administration powers within Supreme Court authority |
| Severability implications | Solomon sought entire bill invalidated based on §43 nonseverability clause | State argued portions could be severable; court need not decide clause validity here | Majority affirmed district court’s invalidation of §11; the district court’s broader severability ruling not addressed further by majority (nonseverability noted but not decided here) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Mitchell, 234 Kan. 185 (1983) (discusses Supreme Court’s rulemaking power and interaction with statutes)
- State, ex rel. v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285 (1976) (four-factor test for "significant interference" with separation of powers)
- State v. Johnson, 61 Kan. 803 (1900) (early strict separation of powers precedent)
- Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v. Michigan, 459 Mich. 291 (1998) (statute encroaching on judicial control of personnel held unconstitutional)
- Petition of Governor & Executive Council, 151 N.H. 1 (2004) (statute altering appointment/term of chief justice was unconstitutional encroachment)
- In re PL. 2001, Chapter 362, 186 N.J. 368 (2006) (statute creating armed probation officers within courts impermissibly compromised judicial independence)