Solesbee v. BrownÂ
255 N.C. App. 603
N.C. Ct. App.2017Background
- Four sisters (Janet Solesbee, Cheryl Brown, Gwenda Angel, Lisa Debruhl) each hold a one-fourth undivided tenancy-in-common in multiple adjoining parcels near Asheville (Parcels One, Two, Three).
- Solesbees (with husband Carl) petitioned for partition by sale; Browns and Angels admitted sale was necessary; Debruhls sought sale of Parcel One but an in-kind allotment of Parcels Two and Three (adjoining their residence).
- Trial court compared combined fair market values and concluded Parcels Two and Three combined were worth materially less than a one-fourth share of the whole; it found rezoning to commercial likely and assigned wide value ranges to parcels.
- Trial court concluded actual (in-kind) partition would cause substantial injury and ordered sale of all parcels together (or Parcel One separately and Parcels Two/Three together).
- Debruhls appealed, arguing the court failed to make required specific findings about values upon physical partition and improperly relied on personal use, difficulty of division, and highest-and-best-use reasoning.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Solesbee) | Defendant's Argument (Debruhl) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court properly ordered partition by sale under N.C.G.S. § 46-22 | Sale justified because combined sale yields higher value and physical partition would substantially injure parties | Trial court lacked required specific findings (value of each parcel and value of shares if physically partitioned); sale improperly based on conjecture | Reversed and remanded: trial court erred for failing to make specific findings required by statute and caselaw |
| Whether the court made sufficient findings on market value | Ranges and overall comparisons suffice to show material difference favoring sale | Ranges are too sweeping; must show value of each share post-partition, not only combined parcel values | Court must quantify fair market values for each parcel and each cotenant’s share upon physical partition before ordering sale |
| Whether difficulty of physical partition alone can justify sale | Physical/geographic limitations and easements make partition impracticable, supporting sale | Difficulty does not excuse the statutory requirement to compare partitioned-share values; owelty must be considered | Difficulty of division is a factor but does not substitute for required valuation findings; court must consider owelty and specific valuations |
| Role of "highest and best use" and personal value in substantial-injury analysis | Rezoning likelihood and highest-and-best-use (commercial) justify sale; owners’ differing personal uses reduce case for in-kind partition | Personal value and speculative rezoning cannot replace statutory economic comparison of partitioned vs. sale values | Personal preferences and speculative rezoning/"highest and best use" cannot supplant statutory valuation analysis; court must make objective findings of value |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Boger, 263 N.C. 248 (N.C. 1965) (partition-in-kind favored; court must determine whether difference in value is so material as to justify sale)
- Partin v. Dalton, 122 N.C. App. 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (to justify sale, trial court must have evidence of value unpartitioned and of each share if partitioned)
- Lyons-Hart v. Hart, 205 N.C. App. 232 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (difficulty of partition insufficient alone; court must consider fair market values when assessing substantial injury)
- Whatley v. Whatley, 126 N.C. App. 193 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (decision to order partition or sale rests within trial court’s discretion but is reviewable for legal error)
Conclusion: The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to make the specific, objective findings of fair market value (including the value of each cotenant’s share upon physical partition) required by N.C.G.S. § 46-22 and governing precedent before ordering a partition by sale.