607 F.Supp.3d 323
S.D.N.Y.2022Background
- Plaintiffs (filed 2004) sued the PLO and PA under the Anti-Terrorism Act and state law for terrorist attacks harming U.S. citizens.
- The district court initially found general personal jurisdiction; the Second Circuit vacated that ruling after Daimler, holding defendants were not "at home" in the U.S. and specific jurisdiction was lacking (Waldman).
- In response, Congress enacted the PSJVTA, adding two consent-based jurisdictional prongs: a "payments" prong and a "U.S. activities" (in-territory) prong.
- The Second Circuit remanded for a limited determination of the PSJVTA's applicability and constitutionality to this case; this Court earlier held the payments prong would be unconstitutional as applied.
- Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration to apply the PSJVTA's U.S. activities prong (consular services, media interviews/notarizations, New York office). Defendants disputed applicability and argued due-process limits.
- The Court held that even if the U.S. activities factual predicate were met, deeming consent based on those activities would violate the Due Process Clause; the PSJVTA is unconstitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Defendants' U.S. conduct satisfies PSJVTA "U.S. activities" prong | Their consular services, media interviews, notarizations, and NY office constitute non-U.N. U.S. activities that trigger consent | Activities either fall within statutory U.N./ancillary exclusions or are insufficient to show consent | Even assuming predicate met, these activities do not amount to meaningful consent; jurisdiction would violate due process |
| Whether Congress may constitutionally deem such conduct to be consent to jurisdiction | Congress may declare that certain conduct constitutes consent to suit in U.S. courts | Due process limits Congress; consent cannot be manufactured by statute absent meaningful assent | Court: Congress cannot constitutionally convert past conduct into consent without satisfying due-process requirements; PSJVTA invalid as applied |
| Whether alternate jurisdiction theories salvage jurisdiction (tag, "doing business," receipt of benefits) | Tagging, historical "doing business" precedents, or receipt of U.S. benefits show consent or jurisdiction | Tag applies only to individuals; nineteenth-century precedents are obsolete; benefits relate to specific jurisdiction, not consent | Rejected: tag inapplicable to foreign entities; old precedents require transactions not present; receipt-of-benefits pertains to specific jurisdiction, not consent |
Key Cases Cited
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (personal-jurisdiction "at home" standard)
- Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016) (vacating district-court jurisdiction findings)
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (establishing modern minimum-contacts test)
- Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (tag jurisdiction principles)
- Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619 (discussing limits of consent theories under due process)
- Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. jurisdiction precedents involving foreign defendants)
- Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (historical "doing business" consent precedent)
- Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. 65 (19th-century precedent on presumed assent from doing business)
- Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062 (tag-jurisdiction limited to individuals)