590 F.Supp.3d 589
S.D.N.Y.2022Background
- Plaintiffs sued the PLO and Palestinian Authority under the Antiterrorism Act (ATA) in 2004; after a seven‑week trial a jury awarded plaintiffs a verdict that was later vacated by the Second Circuit for lack of personal jurisdiction (Waldman I).
- Congress enacted the ATCA and later the PSJVTA to create statutory "deemed consent" personal jurisdiction in ATA suits when certain factual predicates are met (e.g., payments to families of persons who committed terrorism or maintaining U.S. offices/activities).
- The Second Circuit initially declined to recall its mandate under ATCA because the factual predicates were not met; the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the PSJVTA (Sokolow).
- On remand this Court found plaintiffs proved the PSJVTA payment predicate: defendants continued "shahid" (martyr) payments after April 18, 2020 to families of individuals who died while committing attacks that injured U.S. nationals (e.g., Wafa Idris).
- Defendants did not meaningfully contest that such payments were made, but argued (1) some convictions were not "fairly tried" and (2) U.S. activities are UN‑related or exempt; the Court applied 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e)(1)(A)(ii) and did not reach other predicate issues.
- The Court held that although the PSJVTA applies on the payment predicate, the statute is unconstitutional because deeming consent from these payments violates the Due Process Clause (implied/constructive consent cannot be premised on such conduct).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PSJVTA applies based on payments to families of deceased terrorists | Payments made after April 18, 2020 to families of those who died committing terrorism satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e)(1)(A)(ii) | Payments were routine but defendants dispute fairness of underlying convictions for related § 2334(e)(1)(A)(i) predicate | Held: Payment predicate satisfied; PSJVTA applies under § 2334(e)(1)(A)(ii) |
| Whether PSJVTA applies based on U.S. offices/activities | Defendants maintained NYC office, provided services, held events after Jan 4, 2020, satisfying § 2334(e)(1)(B) | NYC office is part of PLO U.N. mission and activities are UN official or otherwise exempt under § 2334(e)(3) | Held: Court did not resolve these B‑prong disputes (applied A(ii) instead) |
| Whether deeming consent via PSJVTA violates Due Process | Implied consent doctrine permits personal jurisdiction based on voluntary conduct; no reciprocity needed | Deemed consent is not a voluntary, reciprocal waiver of jurisdiction and so violates Due Process | Held: PSJVTA unconstitutional; statute’s deemed‑consent attaches jurisdiction based on conduct unrelated to litigation and cannot support implied consent |
| Whether constructive/implied‑consent doctrines (Hammond/Ins. Corp.) support PSJVTA | Plaintiffs rely on implied‑consent and analogies to discovery‑sanction cases | Defendants say those doctrines require close relation to litigation or court order; PSJVTA conduct is unrelated | Held: Court rejects analogy; Hammond/Ins. Corp. sanctions tied to litigation conduct—here payments are unrelated, so implied consent cannot be inferred |
Key Cases Cited
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (limits general jurisdiction; requires defendants be "at home")
- Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (permitting sanction‑based presumption of jurisdiction when tied to discovery violations)
- Hammond Packing Co. v. State of Ark., 212 U.S. 322 (recognizing constructive consent from failure to comply with court orders)
- Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir.) (holding no personal jurisdiction; vacating judgment)
- Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 925 F.3d 570 (2d Cir.) (declining to recall mandate under ATCA because predicates not met)
- Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 140 S. Ct. 2714 (remanding Waldman II for consideration in light of PSJVTA)
- Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212 (discussing political‑branches role in foreign‑affairs asset regulation)