213 Conn.App. 128
Conn. App. Ct.2022Background
- Sokolovsky filed a discrimination complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) on Sept. 20, 2017; CHRO issued a release/right-to-sue on Nov. 6, 2018 stating a 90‑day deadline to sue in Superior Court.
- Plaintiff filed an application for waiver of court fees on Jan. 31, 2019 (granted Feb. 4, 2019) but did not serve the summons and complaint on defendants until Feb. 22, 2019.
- Defendants moved to dismiss (July 2019) arguing the action was untimely and the 90‑day deadline in § 46a‑101(e) is jurisdictional; the trial court agreed and dismissed.
- The trial court also held the plaintiff was required to plead the continuing course of conduct doctrine in the complaint to invoke tolling.
- On appeal the Appellate Court reversed: it held § 46a‑101(e)’s 90‑day limit is mandatory (not jurisdictional), subject to waiver and equitable tolling, and that the court erred in requiring pleading of the continuing course of conduct in the complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 46a‑101(e)’s 90‑day filing limit is subject‑matter jurisdictional | Sokolovsky argued the deadline should not bar his suit (and fairness/equitable tolling should apply) | Defendants argued the 90‑day limit is jurisdictional and thus dismissal is required for noncompliance | Held: The 90‑day limit is mandatory, not jurisdictional; subject to waiver and equitable tolling (reversed dismissal) |
| Whether filing a fee‑waiver application constitutes commencement of the action | Plaintiff argued his Jan. 31 fee‑waiver filing should count as commencing the action | Defendants argued an action is commenced only upon service of the writ/summons | Held: Action is commenced by service; the fee‑waiver filing did not commence the action and plaintiff served after the 90‑day deadline |
| Whether the fee‑waiver application tolled the 90‑day period | Plaintiff suggested tolling while the waiver was pending would be equitable | Defendants denied any tolling from the waiver filing | Held: Court found no authority that fee‑waiver filing tolled the deadline; even if tolled to Feb. 4, plaintiff’s service was still late |
| Whether plaintiff was required to plead the continuing course of conduct doctrine in the complaint | Plaintiff relied on continuing course of conduct to toll the deadline and argued he need not have pleaded it in complaint | Defendants contended plaintiff failed to plead that doctrine and so could not rely on it | Held: Trial court erred — the continuing course of conduct is a matter in avoidance to be raised in reply or in opposition when limitations defense first appears; it need not be pleaded in the initial complaint |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258 (Conn. 2001) (time limits may be mandatory but non‑jurisdictional and subject to waiver/equitable tolling)
- Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (U.S. 1982) (EEOC charge‑filing rule is nonjurisdictional and subject to waiver and equitable tolling)
- Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of Education, 270 Conn. 665 (Conn. 2004) (remedial nature and genealogy of antidiscrimination statutes support liberal construction)
- Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Savin Rock Condominium Assn., Inc., 273 Conn. 373 (Conn. 2005) (distinguishing mandatory language from jurisdictional intent)
- Vollemans v. Wallingford, 289 Conn. 57 (Conn. 2008) (liberal construction of antidiscrimination filing periods to avoid defeating meritorious claims)
- Mosby v. Board of Education, 187 Conn. App. 771 (Conn. App. 2019) (Connecticut rule that an action is commenced by service of process)