922 N.W.2d 200
Minn.2019Background
- In 2016 at Spirit Mountain, snowboarder Lucas Anderson performed an aerial trick and landed on ski instructor Julie Soderberg (teaching a six-year-old), seriously injuring her.
- Anderson moved for summary judgment, arguing implied primary assumption of risk negated any duty and barred Soderberg’s negligence claim; district court granted summary judgment for Anderson.
- The court of appeals reversed, assuming (based on precedent) the doctrine applied to skiers and finding genuine fact issues about whether Soderberg appreciated the risk and whether Anderson enlarged inherent risks.
- The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to decide whether to extend implied primary assumption of risk to recreational downhill skiing and snowboarding.
- The Supreme Court declined to extend the doctrine to skiing/snowboarding, affirmed the court of appeals’ disposition (reversal and remand) on different grounds, and overruled Peterson to that extent; it did not abolish the doctrine entirely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether implied primary assumption of risk applies to recreational downhill skiing/snowboarding | Soderberg argued implied primary assumption of risk should not bar her claim and fact issues exist about risk appreciation and whether conduct enlarged inherent risks | Anderson argued skiers assume inherent collision risks, so he owed no duty and summary judgment should be granted | Court refused to extend the doctrine to skiing/snowboarding and reversed the district court (affirming court of appeals’ disposition) |
| Whether antecedent precedent should be overruled/abolished | Soderberg and amici argued for limitation/abolition of the doctrine | Anderson and ski-operator practice urged retention/extension to skiing | Court declined to abolish the doctrine entirely but limited its extension; left existing applications intact |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate on the assumed-applicable doctrine | Soderberg argued material fact disputes preclude summary judgment | Anderson argued undisputed facts entitled him to judgment as a matter of law | Court did not decide this question because it held the doctrine does not apply to skiing/snowboarding |
| Policy: whether extending doctrine would deter participation or harm ski operations | Soderberg argued extension unnecessary and could chill victims; no evidence extension needed for operations | Anderson argued extension appropriate based on participant risk-allocation | Court found no record evidence that refusing extension would harm participation or operators; policy did not favor extension |
Key Cases Cited
- Springrose v. Willmore, 192 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1971) (distinguishes primary and secondary assumption of risk; primary negates duty)
- Daly v. McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 2012) (refuses to extend implied primary assumption to snowmobiling; discusses reluctance to extend doctrine)
- Olson v. Hansen, 216 N.W.2d 124 (Minn. 1974) (refuses to apply primary assumption to snowmobiling; hazards avoidable with careful operation)
- Modec v. City of Eveleth, 29 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 1947) (applies doctrine to hockey where flying pucks are inherent risks)
- Moe v. Steenberg, 147 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1966) (applies doctrine to figure skating collisions but excludes wholly reckless conduct)
- Grisim v. TapeMark Charity Pro-Am Golf Tournament, 415 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. App. 1987) (treats flying golf balls as inherent sport risk; duty limited to providing safe viewing areas)
- Seidl v. Trollhaugen, 232 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1975) (ski-area collision case; did not decide applicability of primary assumption to skiing)