905 F.3d 1009
7th Cir.2018Background
- Bolson (3D-printing developer) and Soarus (distributor of G-Polymer) executed a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) after Soarus provided confidential G-Polymer information and samples.
- Bolson later filed a provisional patent and obtained U.S. Patent No. 8,404,171 for a fused deposition 3D-printing process using G-Polymer.
- Soarus sued, alleging Bolson’s patent application disclosed confidential information in breach of the NDA.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Bolson, concluding the NDA’s plain language allowed Bolson to patent applications using G-Polymer in the fused deposition area despite other confidentiality provisions.
- The dispute focused on paragraphs 6 (prohibiting patent filings using confidential information without Nippon’s consent) and 10 (stating, “Notwithstanding Article 6 hereof, Bolson is free to patent and protect any new applications using G-Polymer® in the specific area of Fused Deposition Method…”).
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding paragraph 10 unambiguously creates an exception to paragraph 6, so no breach occurred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Soarus) | Defendant's Argument (Bolson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Bolson breached the NDA by including G-Polymer information in its patent filing | Paragraph 10 should be read as preserving NDA confidentiality; Bolson may patent only if it does not disclose confidential info without consent | Paragraph 10, beginning with “Notwithstanding Article 6,” creates an exception allowing Bolson to freely patent applications using G-Polymer in the fused deposition area | Court held paragraph 10 unambiguously excepts paragraph 6; no breach |
| Whether extrinsic evidence may be used to interpret the NDA | Seeks consideration of commercial purpose and parties’ expectations to show paragraph 10 shouldn’t nullify confidentiality | Plain language controls; no ambiguity so extrinsic evidence is inadmissible | Court held contract language clear; extrinsic evidence not allowed |
Key Cases Cited
- Bourke v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 159 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 1998) (standard of de novo review for contract interpretation)
- Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39 (Ill. 2011) (clear contract language given plain meaning; extrinsic evidence only if ambiguous)
- Board of Educ. of Maine Tp. High School Dist. No. 207 v. International Ins. Co., 799 N.E.2d 817 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (ordinary meaning of “notwithstanding” cancels contrary provisions)
- Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., 608 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (same meaning of “notwithstanding” in contracts)
- N.L.R.B. v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (U.S. 2017) (confirming ordinary meaning of “notwithstanding” in statutory interpretation)
- Rakowski v. Lucente, 472 N.E.2d 791 (Ill. 1984) (clear written agreements must be enforced as written; no parol evidence when unambiguous)