Snyder v. Phelps
131 S. Ct. 1207
| SCOTUS | 2011

Background

  • Westboro Baptist Church picketed near Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder’s funeral on public land adjacent to public streets, displaying hostile signs; the protest occurred about 1,000 feet from the church and lasted ~30 minutes without violence.
  • Snyder sued Westboro in Maryland federal court under diversity jurisdiction for defamation, publicity given to private life, IIED, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy.
  • District Court granted summary judgment for Westboro on defamation and private life claims; trial proceeded on remaining claims resulting in $2.9M compensatory and $8M punitive (reduced subsequently).
  • Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding First Amendment protection barred the tort claims; Westboro challenged those rulings.
  • This Court held the First Amendment shield did apply to the picketing on public property addressing public concerns, requiring reversal of the verdicts on IIED and intrusion, and concluding the speech deserved special First Amendment protection.
  • The decision was narrow and focused on the specific facts; the epic posting after the funeral was not considered, and a concurrence/dissent addressed broader implications for IIED and private figures.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Does Westboro’s conduct receive First Amendment protection against tort liability? Snyder argues IIED and related torts are actionable despite First Amendment protections. Westboro contends speech on public concerns is fully protected; location and context do not remove protection. Yes; speech on public concerns on public property is protected; liability cannot be imposed for IIED or intrusion.
Can IIED and intrusion claims survive when speech is protected? Even protected speech can cause severe emotional distress to private individuals. Protected speech should shield the speaker from tort liability when content relates to public issues. No; IIED and intrusion claims cannot override First Amendment protection given the speech’s public-concern nature.
Does captive-audience rationale apply to funeral protests? Snyder’s family was a captive audience at a private funeral; speech caused unique harm. Captive-audience doctrine should be limited; this case involved public forum speech, not private coercion. Rejected; the Court declined to extend captive-audience doctrine to bar First Amendment protections in this context.
Does the public-forum status of the speech justify immunity from liability? Speech directed at a private individual at a funeral should not be protected to prevent harm. Public streets are traditional public forums; content-based protections apply but do not immunize all conduct. Public forum status supports protection; however, the decision is narrow to these facts and does not immunize all private-harm cases.

Key Cases Cited

  • Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (U.S. 1988) (IIED protections limit liability for outrageous but protected speech)
  • Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (U.S. 1985) (public/private concern framework for speech protection)
  • Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (U.S. 1983) (public concern analysis requires content, form, context evaluation)
  • Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (U.S. 1988) (time/place restrictions may be allowed in certain targeted picketing)
  • United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (U.S. 1983) (public streets as traditional public forum for speech)
  • Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (U.S. 1989) (protects speech even if offensive; core First Amendment value)
  • New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (robust debate on public issues protected; actual malice standard for defamation)
  • Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1964) (speech on public issues is essential to self-government)
  • Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (U.S. 1940) (protected religious and political speech; hostility to viewpoint not grounds for suppression)
  • Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1990) (defamation element of falsity tied to public figure contexts; not broadly applied to IIED)
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