Snyder v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 3:15-cv-03049

Background

Pamela Snyder filed two separate federal actions in the Northern District of California arising from two distinct mortgage loans on different San Francisco properties: the Sutter Street suit (Case No. 15-cv-03049-JSC) and the Page Street suit (Case No. 15-cv-04228-EDL).
Sutter Street suit (filed June 30, 2015): claims against Nationstar; operative Second Amended Complaint alleges various state consumer- and credit-related claims; written discovery completed, mediation occurred, and trial set for January 17, 2017.
Page Street suit (filed September 17, 2015): claims against Nationstar and Bank of America; operative Third Amended Complaint alleges fraud, negligent misrepresentation, various state mortgage-related statutes, and FDCPA claims; no discovery yet and no trial date—case management scheduled.
On May 23, 2016 Snyder moved to consolidate the two actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42; Nationstar opposed; Bank of America did not respond.
The magistrate judge denied consolidation, finding insufficient common questions of fact or law and that consolidation would cause jury confusion, prejudice to Nationstar, no judicial economy, and undue delay to the Sutter Street trial schedule.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the two actions "involve a common question of law or fact" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)	Snyder: both suits involve alleged credit-score damage from defendants’ reporting, presenting common factual issues that justify consolidation	Nationstar: suits involve different loans, different properties, different initial servicers, different factual scenarios and statutory claims — not sufficiently common	Denied: no common legal issues; factual differences are not sufficiently shared to meet Rule 42(a) threshold
Whether consolidation would risk jury confusion or prejudice defendants	Snyder: consolidation would be efficient; single trial could address overlapping issues	Nationstar: consolidation would force jury to alternate between distinct loans, players, statutes, and evidence, increasing confusion and prejudice	Denied: risk of jury confusion and prejudice to defendants outweighs any benefits
Whether consolidation would promote judicial economy	Snyder: a combined trial would avoid duplicative trials on similar issues	Nationstar: factual and legal differences mean little overlap; consolidation would not save judicial resources	Denied: no meaningful overlap of issues; judicial economy not served
Whether consolidation would cause undue delay given differing case stages	Snyder: consolidation could streamline litigation for Nationstar	Nationstar: Sutter Street is trial-ready (discovery/mediation/trial date); Page Street has not begun discovery—consolidation would delay Sutter Street	Denied: consolidation would unduly delay the already-scheduled Sutter Street trial

Key Cases Cited

Inv’rs Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California, 877 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1989) (district court has broad discretion to consolidate cases)
Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1984) (consolidation should weigh time/effort savings against inconvenience, delay, or expense)
E.E.O.C. v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 1998) (consolidation inappropriate where it causes inefficiency, inconvenience, or unfair prejudice)
Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (denying consolidation when actions do not state the same causes of action and facts are not in common)