Snyder v. Hertzske
2017 UT 4
| Utah | 2017Background
- Edward Hertzske purchased a $500,000 life insurance policy in 2004 naming his then-fiancée Linda Snyder as primary beneficiary and his son Tyler Hertzske as secondary.
- Edward and Linda married in 2005, separated in 2011, and divorced in May 2014; the divorce proceedings and decree made no mention of the life insurance policy and did not include the specific statutory language of Utah Code § 30-3-5(1)(e).
- Edward died less than a month after the divorce decree; both Linda and Tyler claimed entitlement to the policy proceeds.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Tyler, holding that Linda’s beneficiary designation was revoked by divorce under Utah Code § 75-2-804(2) and that neither the divorce decree nor the policy contained the “express terms” required to rebut that presumption.
- On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Tyler.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Snyder) | Defendant's Argument (Hertzske) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 75-2-804(2) revokes a former spouse’s beneficiary designation in a life policy upon divorce | § 75-2-804(2) should not revoke the designation because the policy’s beneficiary-change formalities suffice as "express terms" or legislative intent preserves life policies | § 75-2-804(2) creates a rebuttable presumption of revocation upon divorce absent express terms or a qualifying court order or contract | The statute creates a rebuttable presumption that a beneficiary designation is revoked on divorce; revocation applies here |
| Whether Utah Code § 30-3-5(1)(e) operates to preserve beneficiary designations absent specific statutory language in the decree | The plain purpose of § 30-3-5(1)(e) is to carve out life insurance from revocation-by-divorce and should apply broadly | § 30-3-5(1)(e) only rebuts § 75-2-804 when the decree expressly includes the statutory acknowledgement language required by § 30-3-5(1)(e) | § 30-3-5(1)(e) rebuts the presumption only when its specified language/actions are included in the divorce decree; it did not apply here |
| Whether generic policy provisions about how to change beneficiaries qualify as “express terms” in § 75-2-804(2) | Policy change formalities are sufficient to show intent that beneficiary designations survive divorce | Generic procedural language does not constitute the required express terms referring to divorce; express language referring to divorce is needed | Generic beneficiary-change procedures do not satisfy the "express terms" exception; policy lacked divorce-specific language |
| Whether summary judgment was proper given the purely legal dispute | Snyder contends statutory meaning and intent favor her and raise issues of fact about donor intent | Hertzske argues only statutory interpretation is required and material facts are undisputed | Summary judgment was appropriate; dispute was statutory and legal, not factual |
Key Cases Cited
- Vorher v. Henriod, 297 P.3d 614 (Utah 2013) (statutory-interpretation standard and de novo review)
- State v. Steinly, 345 P.3d 1182 (Utah 2015) (deference and review principles for legal determinations)
- Stillman v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, 343 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. 2003) (use of express terms exception in beneficiary-revocation context)
- Malloy v. Malloy, 288 P.3d 597 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (policy/manual language that explicitly preserved beneficiary post-divorce can satisfy express-terms exception)
- Buchholz v. Storsve, 740 N.W.2d 107 (S.D. 2007) (holding that governing instrument must explicitly state beneficiary survives divorce to avoid revocation)
- LPI Servs. v. McGee, 215 P.3d 135 (Utah 2009) (principle of reading statutory provisions in harmony within a statutory scheme)