Snyder v. Gaudet
756 F.3d 30
1st Cir.2014Background
- Snyder owned a building in a mostly residential area of Waltham, MA, sharing it with two tenants and using it for his business activities.
- Snyder fired a city council member, Serafina Collura, who then pressured officials to investigate alleged land-use violations.
- Gaudet (superintendent) and Powell (senior building inspector) investigated Snyder and later issued a citation citing violation of a 1967 variance governing use of the building.
- The variance allowed professional offices; whether it permitted second-floor residential use was disputed, but Snyder conceded no residential use occurred.
- Snyder admitted certain non-office uses: a massage room, a roofing contractor/paralegal office, and his own office used as a warehouse/storage area for manufacturing components.
- Powell warned Snyder to cease the violations or seek variance modification; Snyder pursued modification, which the zoning board did not grant, and fines began accruing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gaudet and Powell are entitled to qualified immunity | Snyder argues differential treatment violated equal protection. | Gaudet/Powell contend no clearly established right was violated given the variance context. | Gaudet and Powell entitled to qualified immunity |
| Whether Snyder states a valid class-of-one equal protection claim | Snyder asserts he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated. | Defendants argue there were no sufficiently similar comparators and no rational basis shown. | No valid RP claim; no extremely high similarity supports comparator |
| Whether there was a rational basis for differentiating Snyder from the prior owner | Snyder claims the prior owner’s use shows differential treatment. | Defendants point to differences in use and a 2005 ordinance; prior use not sufficiently similar. | There was a rational basis; no comparably situated treatment established |
| Whether time lag between the 1994 letter and 2007 citation undermines any claim | Snyder relies on a long gap to support discriminatory intent. | Policy changes over time (e.g., 2005 ordinance) negate the inference of discriminatory intent. | Time gap defeats equal protection claim likelihood; no clear establishment |
| Whether Snyder can rely on himself as a comparator | Snyder suggests using himself post-Collura firing as a comparator. | Court should require a true comparator; self-comparison is improper and unsupported. | Not appropriate; self-comparator not established as required |
Key Cases Cited
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal protection requires 'extremely high similarity' and no rational basis)
- Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906 (1st Cir. 1995) (bad-faith/intent standard for class-of-one claims; not required here)
- Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245 (1st Cir. 2007) (rigor of similarity requirement; land-use context requires strict comparators)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (clearly established standard for rights undisputedly violated)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (right to be clearly established at the time of conduct; qualified immunity standard)
- Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (interlocutory appeal standard for factual inferences on qualified immunity)