131 So. 3d 1251
Miss. Ct. App.2014Background
- Snowden was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to 20 years with 15 suspended, 5 to serve; the appeal contests the indictment and related issues.
- Indictment charged Snowden under 97-3-7(2)(a) but alleged only bodily injury, not serious bodily injury required by (2)(a).
- Jury instruction S-1 allowed conviction if Snowden caused bodily injury with a deadly weapon under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.
- Snowden argued the indictment was duplicitous and legally defective for not alleging all essential elements of (2)(a) or for blending subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b).
- Evidence showed Snowden admitted firing warning shots; defense argued no intent to injure Smith, and alleged transferred-intent theory raised by the State.
- The court reversed the aggravated-assault conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded to sentence for simple assault; issues were moot thereafter.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indictment sufficiency for 97-3-7(2)(a) | Snowden: indictment defective, not alleging serious bodily injury. | Snowden: indictment properly informed of charges despite language. | Indictment defective; reversed and remanded for simple assault. |
| Possibility of dual-subsection charging in indictment | Snowden: blending (2)(a) and (2)(b) renders indictment fatally flawed. | Snowden: indictment informs of aggravated assault; any surplusage is harmless. | Indictment defective under (2)(a) analysis; requires remand for lesser offense. |
| Transfer of intent and sufficiency of proof under (2)(b) | State relied on transferred intent to convict under (2)(b) despite lack of direct evidence. | Snowden: no evidence of purposeful/knowingly shooting; transferred-intent theory unsupported. | Insufficient proof for (2)(b); supports reversal and simple-assault remand. |
| Appropriate remedy after reversal | Snowden: conviction should stand if elements proven. | State: undecided aspects require different remedy. | Direct remand for sentencing on simple assault; moot remaining issues. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stevens v. State, 808 So.2d 908 (Miss. 2002) (indictment may charge under both subsections of 97-3-7(2))
- Johnson v. State, 910 So.2d 1174 (Miss. 2005) (blending subsections not necessarily reversible; latitude in §97-3-7(2))
- White v. State, 958 So.2d 241 (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (surplusage in indictment not fatal; not prejudicial)
- Spears v. State, 175 So.2d 158 (Miss. 1965) (essential elements must be charged in statutory offense indictment)
- Odom v. State, 767 So.2d 242 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (simple assault as lesser-included offense concept)
- Shields v. State, 722 So.2d 584 (Miss.1998) (direct-remand rule for sentencing on lesser-included offenses)