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Snow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
156 So. 3d 538
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2015
Read the full case

Background

  • Snows executed a May 25, 2007 mortgage and note on Florida property; optional acceleration clause requires lender to exercise option and give notice to accelerate.
  • Notice of default issued December 7, 2007 stated future acceleration if default not cured but did not declare immediate due date.
  • December 7, 2007 letter identified cure amount and stated acceleration would occur only if not cured; it did not demand full immediate payment.
  • Foreclosure action filed March 12, 2008 asserting default and acceleration; initial action later dismissed without prejudice.
  • Second foreclosure action filed March 5, 2013; Snows argued five-year statute of limitations barred it because acceleration occurred January 10, 2008 and five years elapsed January 10, 2013.
  • Trial court held acceleration occurred March 12, 2008 and second action timely; appellate review de novo.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
When does the statute of limitations begin for a mortgage with an optional acceleration clause? Snows: acceleration occurred January 10, 2008. Wells Fargo: acceleration occurred March 12, 2008. Acceleration date is March 12, 2008 (filing of foreclosure).
Did the December 7, 2007 notice constitute acceleration or merely notice of default and intent to accelerate? Snows: letter attempted to accelerate. Wells Fargo: letter merely a future-intent notice, not acceleration. Letter did not accelerate; acceleration occurred upon filing March 12, 2008 foreclosure complaint.

Key Cases Cited

  • Baader v. Walker, 153 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (absolute vs. optional acceleration distinguished)
  • Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (filing foreclosure can operate as acceleration notice)
  • Rones v. Charlisa, Inc., 948 So.2d 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (acceleration requires clear action indicating intent to accelerate)
  • Central Home Trust Co. of Elizabeth v. Lippincott, 392 So.2d 931 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (default/notice without acceleration language not automatic acceleration)
  • Greene v. Bursey, 733 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (affirmative action to alert debtor to acceleration required for acceleration)
  • Monte v. Tipton, 612 So.2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (acceleration on optional clause—limitations commence on acceleration)
  • Locke v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 509 So.2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (limitations do not run until default on final installment absent acceleration)
  • Conner v. Coggins, 349 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (mortgage default and timing of accrual with acceleration clause)
  • Yelen v. Bankers Trust Co., 476 So.2d 767 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (tender may cure default and prevent acceleration)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Snow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Court Name: District Court of Appeal of Florida
Date Published: Jan 14, 2015
Citation: 156 So. 3d 538
Docket Number: 3D14-1547
Court Abbreviation: Fla. Dist. Ct. App.