Snook v. Swan, 423 P.3d 747

Plaintiff filed a special motion to strike under Oregon’s anti‑SLAPP statute, ORS 31.150, targeting defendant’s counterclaim for libel per se.
The trial court found plaintiff met the first-step burden that the counterclaim arose from protected speech under ORS 31.150(2)(c).
The burden then shifted to defendant to show a probability of prevailing by presenting "substantial evidence to support a prima facie case."
Defendant opposed the motion in writing but did not submit any affidavit or declaration tied to the special motion; later documents were untimely or did not reference the motion.
The trial court, mistakenly believing ORS 31.150 did not require affidavits/declarations, denied the special motion and entered a limited judgment.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding defendant failed to present evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find she met her burden of production, and remanded with instructions to grant the special motion to strike the libel counterclaim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the counterclaim arose from activity protected by ORS 31.150	Plaintiff argued the claim arose from a written statement in a public forum on an issue of public interest	Defendant did not contest that ORS 31.150(2)(c) applied	Court agreed plaintiff met the first-step burden and ORS 31.150(2)(c) applied
Whether defendant met shifted burden to present substantial evidence supporting a prima facie defamation case	Plaintiff argued defendant presented no affidavits/declarations or other admissible evidence supporting a prima facie case	Defendant argued the statute did not require her to present evidence by affidavit or declaration and relied on her written opposition	Court held defendant was required to present evidentiary submissions; because she presented no admissible evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find she met her burden, the motion should have been granted

Handy v. Lane County, 360 Or. 605 (interpreting "substantial evidence to support a prima facie case" as evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find the plaintiff met the burden of production)
Wingard v. Oregon Family Council, Inc., 290 Or. App. 518 (describing the two-step burden-shifting process under ORS 31.150)
Yes on 24-367 Committee v. Deaton, 276 Or. App. 347 (explaining anti‑SLAPP purpose to permit early dismissal of questionable suits involving public participation)
Young v. Davis, 259 Or. App. 497 (discussing SLAPP acronym and public participation context)