Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc.
158 A.3d 787
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- On Dec. 3, 2009, Norwalk Yellow Cab driver Johnley Saineval left his cab unlocked in a high‑crime housing complex with the keys in the ignition; two teenagers (Johnson and Bowden) stole the cab and later, in Stamford, Bowden drove onto a sidewalk and struck Brenda Snell, causing severe injuries.
- Snell sued Saineval and Yellow Cab for negligence (respondeat superior), alleging leaving the keys foreseeably created a risk of theft and injury; the teens were not named as defendants and were barred from apportionment because their conduct was pleaded as reckless/criminal.
- Defendants asserted as a special defense that the teens’ intervening criminal conduct was a superseding cause that cut off liability.
- The trial court instructed the jury on proximate cause and on superseding cause/scope of risk, submitted interrogatories (jury found Saineval negligent and foreseeable risk, found his negligence proximately caused injury, but also found the accident was outside the scope of the risk and returned a defendants’ verdict).
- Plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict/new trial arguing (1) superseding cause was inapplicable because the teens did not specifically intend to harm Snell, (2) jury instructions/interrogatories were misleading, and (3) the verdict was irreconcilable with interrogatory answers. The trial court denied the motion; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of superseding‑cause doctrine | Superseding cause requires the intervenor to have intended to harm the plaintiff; here no such specific intent was shown | Superseding cause may apply where intervening conduct is criminal/reckless and unforeseeable in scope, even absent specific intent to harm | Court held superseding cause remains viable for unforeseeable criminal events or reckless criminal conduct; not limited to intent to harm; jury could consider it |
| Jury instructions and interrogatory content | Court should not have given a superseding‑cause charge or an interrogatory about scope of risk; charge was confusing and incomplete | Instruction was appropriate to present factual question of whether intervening criminal acts were outside scope of risk; phrasing favored plaintiff if anything | Instructions and interrogatories, read as a whole, were sufficient and not reversible error; any imperfection was harmless to plaintiff |
| Consistency of verdict with interrogatories | Affirmative findings that Saineval’s negligence was proximate cause and that theft/accident were foreseeable are inconsistent with verdict for defendants | Jury could reasonably find Saineval’s negligence was a proximate cause yet that intervening criminal acts nonetheless superseded liability (or that negligence was not a substantial factor) | Court held answers could be harmonized; verdict was legally consistent and denial of new trial proper |
| Allocation/burden when defending with superseding cause | (Implicit) plaintiff suggested defense was unavailable given apportionment bar against naming teens | Defendants argued superseding cause appropriate because apportionment unavailable for non‑negligent (reckless/criminal) actors | Court accepted that when apportionment is unavailable and intervening criminal/reckless acts are claimed, superseding cause can be raised as defense (burden allocation in this case placed on defendants) |
Key Cases Cited
- Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424 (Conn. 2003) (abolished superseding‑cause defense for intervening negligence but left exceptions for unforeseeable intentional torts, forces of nature, or criminal events)
- Sullivan v. Metro‑North Commuter Railroad Co., 292 Conn. 150 (Conn. 2009) (approved submitting superseding‑cause instruction where intervening intentional criminal act was alleged)
- Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597 (Conn. 1995) (endorsing Restatement approach to superseding cause and related foreseeability analysis)
- Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315 Conn. 320 (Conn. 2015) (explains proximate cause as substantial‑factor and foreseeability inquiry)