430 F. App'x 346
5th Cir.2011Background
- Snapt, Inc. sued Ellipse Communications, Inc. and Ellipse Communications I, L.P. for unfair competition and related claims under state and federal law.
- The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment on the remaining claim (Texas Harmful Access by Computer Statute).
- The court noted the amended complaint was not clearly drafted and limited certain liabilities; Ellipse’s summary judgment motion followed Snapt’s opposition with various evidentiary materials.
- On appeal, Snapt contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to retain pendent state claims after dismissing federal claims; the court addressed supplemental jurisdiction standards.
- The appellate court ultimately affirms the grant of summary judgment and discusses evidentiary and pleading issues raised in the record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court properly retained jurisdiction over pendent state claims. | Snapt argues the district court lost jurisdiction after dismissing federal claims. | Ellipse contends discretion to retain jurisdiction depends on Mendoza factors. | The district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction. |
| Whether Texas unfair competition requires an independent tort. | Snapt maintains unfair competition includes an independent tort and can rely on underlying claims. | Ellipse relies on Taylor Publishing Co. limiting unfair competition to independent torts. | The court agrees with Taylor, and Snapt did not raise this argument timely; dismissal upheld. |
| Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on the Texas Harmful Access by Computer Statute claim. | Snapt argues evidence (Caven/Jones declarations) supports the claim. | Declarations lack admissible expert qualification and contain inadmissible hearsay; evidence fails. | Summary judgment affirmed on evidentiary grounds; alternative time-period ground also supported. |
| Whether the Caven and Jones declarations could be admitted as expert or lay testimony. | Declarations show personal knowledge and investigative conclusions. | Declarations are unqualified; admissibility under Rule 702 and hearsay rules denied. | Court did not abuse its discretion in striking or excluding them; remaining evidence insufficient. |
| Whether the CDs and emails constitute competent evidence to defeat summary judgment. | CDs contain logs of scraping/hacking. | CDs are inadmissible hearsay without custodian testimony or certification; emails do not prove violation. | CDs and emails insufficient; summary judgment affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2000) (Texas unfair competition requires an independent tort)
- United States Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993) (relevant to independent tort requirements in Texas unfair competition)
- Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2008) (multifactor analysis for supplemental jurisdiction not limited to one factor)
- Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1992) (factors for discretionary jurisdiction decisions in related actions)
- Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008) (admissibility and reliability standards for expert testimony)
- Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam on evidentiary issues in summary judgment)
- Farina v. Mission Inv. Trust, 615 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1980) (controlling evidentiary standards in civil procedure)