Smith v. Walgreen Co.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113441
D. Del.2013Background
- Erica P. Smith, an African‑American senior certified pharmacy technician, worked at Walgreens’ Dover, DE store from 2008 until her termination on May 31, 2011.
- On May 12, 2011 Smith had a brief, joking physical interaction with co‑worker Sharon Meer (white); Smith says she pretended to bite Meer’s sleeve and denies an actual bite. Surveillance video was produced.
- Co‑worker Norah Rennewanz (white) reported the incident to store manager Eric Brauch; Meer gave an unsworn written statement saying Smith bit her. Brauch investigated and suspended Smith.
- During the investigation Smith reported prior racially derogatory remarks by Rennewanz; Rennewanz later admitted making such comments and received a written warning for harassment/discrimination.
- Brauch terminated Smith for violating Walgreens’ Policy Against Workplace Violence (Brauch viewed biting as a violent act); Smith’s position was filled by a white replacement. Smith filed Title VII and §1981 race discrimination claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Smith established a prima facie case of race discrimination | Smith is African‑American, was qualified, terminated, and replaced by a white employee — supports inference of discrimination | Walgreens contested fourth element but conceded at argument | Court: Smith met prima facie requirements |
| Whether Walgreens articulated a legitimate non‑discriminatory reason for termination | N/A (Smith does not dispute an articulated reason) | Termination was for violating workplace‑violence policy (belief Smith bit a coworker) | Court: Walgreens met its burden — legitimate reason articulated |
| Whether Walgreens’ stated reason was pretextual (Fuentes prong 1: show employer’s reason is unworthy of credence) | Video and contemporaneous evidence show the interaction appeared playful, delay in reporting, Meer’s nonchalant reaction, and coworkers smiling — undermines the “violent act” characterization | Employer relies on witness statements and investigation results concluding Smith bit Meer | Court: Fact issues exist; a reasonable jury could disbelieve Walgreens’ explanation — survive summary judgment |
| Whether discriminatory motive was more likely than not (Fuentes prong 2: comparators/ disparate treatment) | Rennewanz (white) committed comparable misconduct (racial remarks), was investigated by same people and disciplined less severely (written warning) — shows disparate treatment | Walgreens points to six other employees (various races) terminated for workplace violence at other locations to show consistent enforcement | Court: Rennewanz is a valid comparator given same position, supervisor, investigator, and contemporaneous timing; other terminated employees were sufficiently different (different supervisors, locations, and more serious admissions) — jury question remains |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (framework for burden‑shifting in discrimination cases)
- Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (plaintiff’s prima facie burden and burdens shifting clarified)
- Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (two‑prong test for showing pretext under McDonnell Douglas)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (court must draw all reasonable inferences for nonmoving party; ultimate burden remains with plaintiff)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (summary judgment standard; nonmoving party must present specific facts showing genuine dispute)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant’s burden at summary judgment and consequences if nonmovant fails to meet burden)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine dispute defined by whether a reasonable jury could find for nonmovant)
- Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639 (3d Cir. 1998) (use and limits of comparator evidence)
- Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101 (3d Cir. 1997) (plaintiff must show employer’s stated reason is so plainly wrong it cannot be the real reason)