513 P.3d 729
Utah2022Background
- Volkswagen issued a mandatory stop-sale safety recall for certain vehicles due to a defective fuel-injection line; SouthTowne (a dealer) sold one such vehicle to Lois Smith.
- While driving from Utah to Washington shortly after purchase, Smith smelled fumes, developed headache, drowsiness, and other symptoms, and saw smoke from the engine; a dealer found a cracked fuel line and pooled diesel on the turbocharger/exhaust manifold.
- Smith was later diagnosed with carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning supported by MRI findings and medical expert opinion; she alleged long-term neurological deficits.
- At trial Smith presented mechanical and medical experts (including a lab test showing CO generation in an enclosed setup); the jury returned a $2.7 million verdict for Smith on negligence and strict liability.
- The district court granted SouthTowne judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) for insufficient causation and conditionally ordered a new trial by excluding portions of two experts’ testimony; SouthTowne’s subsequent Rule 60(b) motion alleged juror misconduct.
- The Utah Supreme Court reversed the JMOL and the conditional new-trial order (on procedural-notice grounds), affirmed other evidentiary rulings, and dismissed SouthTowne’s Rule 60(b) motion as untimely, reinstating the jury verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Smith) | Defendant's Argument (SouthTowne) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Was evidence sufficient to prove causation (JMOL)? | Cumulative evidence (lab test, mechanic’s observations of fuel, experts on engine temps, medical diagnosis, symptoms, MRI, and differential diagnosis) permits a non-speculative inference that leaking diesel produced CO that poisoned Smith. | Evidence was speculative: lab test was not representative of under-hood conditions; no direct quantification of CO in passenger compartment; experts only showed possibility, not probability. | Reversed JMOL. Court held the total record allowed reasonable jurors to infer CO was produced, entered passenger compartment at harmful levels, and caused Smith’s injuries (Alder principles applied). |
| 2. Was plaintiff required to present an expert on dealership standard of care for recalls? | No—jury could apply ordinary reasonable-person negligence standard given testimony about stop-sale order and that the vehicle was identified by VIN; expert not required. | Yes—recall procedures are technical and require expert testimony to establish the standard of care. | Rejected SouthTowne’s argument. Court held jury had sufficient evidence about the stop-sale order and dealership practices; expert not required; alternative argument would not defeat strict liability claim. |
| 3. Was conditional new trial warranted based on exclusion of expert testimony (Leiss and Weaver)? | Exclusions were improper and procedurally unfair because SouthTowne had not raised the specific objections relied on by the court and Smith was not given notice or opportunity to respond under Rule 59(d). | Court’s concerns about the reliability of Leiss’s lab reliance and Weaver’s differential diagnosis justified exclusion and a new trial. | Reversed conditional new-trial order. Court found the district court exceeded proper Rule 59(d) procedure by ruling on grounds not raised by SouthTowne without giving Smith notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard. |
| 4. Was SouthTowne’s Rule 60(b) motion timely (juror-misconduct/newly discovered evidence)? | SouthTowne contends the misconduct evidence was newly discovered and timely under Rule 60(b)(2)/(6). | The alleged juror-misconduct claim should have been raised within the Rule 59 new-trial deadline; Rule 60(b)(2) timing applies and SouthTowne failed to act with due diligence. | Dismissed Rule 60(b) motion as untimely. Court held the substance fell under Rule 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) and SouthTowne had sufficient notice earlier to have met the Rule 59 deadline. |
Key Cases Cited
- Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 61 P.3d 1068 (Utah 2002) (toxic-tort causation: plaintiffs need not always quantify dose; circumstantial evidence and differential diagnosis can suffice to create triable issue)
- Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1996) (standard for reviewing directed verdict/JMOL—view evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party)
- Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22 (Utah 1999) (trial court must consider evidence as admitted at trial when ruling on JMOL; evidence admitted over objection is considered)
- Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999) (expert testimony requires sufficient factual foundation and logical nexus to support causation opinions)
- McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (U.S. 1984) (two-part test for juror nondisclosure/voir dire misconduct claims)
- Braithwaite v. W. Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997 (Utah 1996) (new trial is an extraordinary remedy; courts should order one only where verdict is manifestly against weight of evidence)