Smith v. United States
2:16-cv-08111
N.D. Ala.May 8, 2017Background
- Petitioner Valecio Jamell Smith pleaded guilty to carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and to using/brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)); sentence totaled 147 months; judgment entered May 8, 2013.
- Smith did not file a direct appeal.
- Over three years after his conviction became final, Smith filed a § 2255 motion arguing Johnson v. United States invalidated § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual-clause definition of “crime of violence,” so his § 924(c) conviction must be vacated.
- The Government opposed; the court considered Eleventh Circuit precedent addressing whether Johnson applies to § 924(c) and whether carjacking qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A).
- The court relied on In re Smith, which explained Johnson invalidated only the ACCA residual clause and did not automatically invalidate § 924(c)’s residual clause; and on United States v. Moore, holding carjacking satisfies § 924(c)’s force clause.
- The court denied § 2255 relief and declined to issue a certificate of appealability, finding Smith did not make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson invalidates § 924(c)’s residual clause and thus Smith’s § 924(c) conviction | Johnson’s holding on ACCA residual clause applies to § 924(c)(3)(B), rendering it unconstitutionally vague | Johnson addressed ACCA only; § 924(c) uses different language and has not shown the same vagueness problems; Eleventh Circuit precedent forecloses application | Denied — Johnson does not automatically invalidate § 924(c)’s residual clause and Eleventh Circuit precedent controls |
| Whether federal carjacking (§ 2119) qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force/element clause) | If § 924(c)’s residual clause is invalid, underlying convictions might not qualify; Smith argues his predicate no longer suffices | Carjacking’s elements (take by force/violence or intimidation) satisfy § 924(c)(3)(A)’s force clause per Eleventh Circuit law | Held that carjacking satisfies § 924(c)(3)(A); thus Smith’s § 924(c) conviction remains valid |
| Timeliness under § 2255(f)(3) to invoke Johnson | Smith filed within one year of Johnson decision (petition mailed within statute) | Government opposed on merits rather than timeliness; court considered claim timely under § 2255(f)(3) | Timeliness not dispositive; claim rejected on merits |
| Certificate of appealability (COA) | Implicit request for COA with § 2255 motion | No substantial showing of denial of constitutional right; issues not debatable among reasonable jurists | COA denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (struck ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson applies retroactively on collateral review)
- In re Smith, 829 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2016) (explained Johnson does not automatically invalidate § 924(c)’s residual clause and held carjacking qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A))
- United States v. Moore, 43 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 1994) (held federal carjacking falls within § 924(c)(3)(A)’s force clause)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (standard for certificate of appealability)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (further guidance on COA standard)
