799 S.E.2d 479
S.C.2017Background
- December 2012 auto collision: Smith injured when Mizzell’s car, exiting a gas station, collided with Smith; Tiffany’s parked commercial truck allegedly obstructed Mizzell’s view.
- Mizzell settled with Smith for his policy limits and obtained a covenant not to execute; Smith then sued Tiffany, Brown Trucking, and Brown Logistics for negligence (including respondeat superior, negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, and maintenance).
- Appellants (Brown Trucking and Brown Logistics) filed a third-party complaint seeking to join Mizzell (immune by settlement) to have the jury apportion fault to him under the South Carolina Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (the Act).
- Trial court granted summary judgment for Mizzell, holding he owed no duty to appellants, was immune from contribution under section 15-38-50, and could not be impleaded or joined under Rules 14 or 19 SCRCP for apportionment purposes.
- The Supreme Court affirmed: the Act’s unambiguous text limits apportionment to the plaintiff and defendants; the Act codifies the ‘‘empty chair’’ defense and provides setoff rules and settling-tortfeasor immunity that preclude joining an immune settlor for allocation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Smith) | Defendant's Argument (Brown Trucking/Logistics) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a settling, immune nonparty (Mizzell) can be joined or included on the verdict form so jury can apportion fault to him under the Act | Smith relied on the Act and covenant: he settled with Mizzell and did not name him as a defendant | Appellants argued Rule 14/19 and the 2005 Act amendments permit joinder so fault can be apportioned and avoid unfair joint-and-several exposure | Court held no — the Act’s plain language limits apportionment to the plaintiff and defendants; settling tortfeasor immune under §15-38-50; impleader and joinder improper here |
| Whether Rule 14 impleader applies to a settling tortfeasor immune from contribution | N/A | Appellants: Rule 14 allows impleader of any who may be liable for part of plaintiff’s claim | Court held no — impleader requires the third-party to be liable to the impleading defendant; statutory immunity and the covenant preclude such liability |
| Whether Rule 19 joinder is required because complete relief cannot be accorded without the alleged culpable nonparty | N/A | Appellants: without Mizzell the 100% apportionment among present parties will be distorted, risking unfair joint-and-several liability | Court held no — longstanding ‘‘plaintiff chooses’’ rule and the Act’s text do not make a mere joint tortfeasor a necessary party; Rule 19 joinder not required |
| Whether courts should read procedural rules to override or expand the Act to achieve perceived equity | N/A | Appellants urged courts to use Rules 14/19 and due process to achieve fair apportionment | Court held no — separation of powers requires honoring unambiguous legislative policy in the Act; courts may not rewrite statute for perceived equity |
Key Cases Cited
- Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm’n, 254 S.C. 378, 175 S.E.2d 805 (S.C. 1970) (statute clear on its face need not be construed)
- Paschal v. State Election Comm’n, 317 S.C. 434, 454 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 1995) (no resort outside statute absent ambiguity)
- Machin v. Carus Corp., 419 S.C. 527, 799 S.E.2d 468 (S.C. 2017) (Act permits only defendants to be listed on jury form for allocation)
- Walker v. Tensor Machinery Ltd., 298 Ga. 297, 779 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 2015) (contrast case allowing fault to be assessed against immune nonparty under different statutory language)
- Chester v. S.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 388 S.C. 343, 698 S.E.2d 559 (S.C. 2010) (reaffirmed plaintiff’s right to choose defendants despite statutory changes)
- Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 414 S.C. 185, 777 S.E.2d 824 (S.C. 2015) (Act balances preventing double recovery and promoting settlement)
- First Gen. Servs. of Charleston, Inc. v. Miller, 314 S.C. 439, 445 S.E.2d 446 (S.C. 1994) (impleader improper where third-party defendant is directly liable to plaintiff)