Smith v. Swick & Shapiro, P.C., 75 A.3d 898

Ms. Smith was FDIC employee in DRR and was separated due to a 2005 RIF, placed in Group I tenure with subgroup B, and did not receive a round-two position; she retained S&S to sue the FDIC for wrongful termination implied by discrimination and RIF procedures.
FDIC denied her claims on May 1, 2007; S&S failed to file a timely federal appeal within 30 days and did not notify Ms. Smith for about five months.
Ms. Smith filed a legal malpractice action against S&S in 2010 alleging breach of duty and causation.
The trial court granted summary judgment for S&S after concluding no triable issues on pretext in FDIC’s RIF and that S&S’s conduct did not proximately cause Ms. Smith’s losses.
On appeal, the court held there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Smith failed to show S&S’s breach proximately caused damages in the underlying FDIC case.
The FDIC’s RIF regulations and the evidence in the ROI supported the trial court’s determinations about the RIF and pretext.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment	Smith argues disputes exist about generalist vs. specialized DRR environment and qualifications.	S&S contends record shows no genuine issue of material fact and FDIC’s RIF relied on legitimate reasons.	No genuine issue of material fact precludes judgment; FDIC reasons were legitimate.
Whether expert testimony created a triable issue on causation	Chuzi’s opinions show breach and proximate causation.	Court should defer to FDIC regulations and expert Mergen; legal questions governed by court.	No triable issue; summary judgment appropriate.
Whether Smith established proximate cause in the malpractice action	S&S’s failure to timely file an appeal caused damages.	No proof that late filing by S&S caused the claimed damages; FDIC’s reasons were non-discriminatory.	Cannot prove proximate cause; judgment for S&S affirmed.

Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (U.S. 2006) (pretext standard linked to qualifications evidence in employment discrimination)
Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quantifies ‘far superior’ qualifications in pretext analysis)
Tolson v. James, 315 F.Supp.2d 110 (D.D.C. 2004) (pretext analysis framework in qualifications disparity)
Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (standard for when qualifications disparity supports inference of discrimination)
Futrell v. Department of Labor Fed. Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793 (D.C. 2003) (summary judgment in motive/intent cases appropriate with proper evidence)
Reeves v. Sanderson Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (circumstantial evidence may support finding of discrimination)
Aliotta v. Bair, 614 F.3d 556 (U.S. App. D.C. 2010) (affirming summary judgment where DRR transition supported legitimate reasons)
Bradshaw v. District of Columbia, 43 A.3d 318 (D.C. 2012) (summary judgment standard for employment-action context)
Aziken v. District of Columbia, 70 A.3d 213 (D.C. 2013) (standard for evaluating credibility and evidence in summary judgment)
McFarland v. George Washington Univ., 935 A.2d 337 (D.C. 2007) (limits on defeating summary judgment with conclusory allegations)