Smith v. State, 162 A.3d 955

Stephanie L. Smith pleaded guilty to a theft charge pursuant to a binding plea agreement: agreed cap 5 years, with 30–90 days actual jail (suspended remainder) and 5 years supervised probation; restitution $47,460.02; State would nolle other counts.
At the plea hearing the prosecutor represented the agreement was binding and could be modified only by consent of both parties; the judge conditionally accepted, heard factual proffer, then expressly accepted the plea and stated he would be bound to the agreed range.
At sentencing the judge, citing employment concerns, declined to enter a conviction and instead entered probation before judgment and ordered 60 days home detention (weekend confinement), without prior notice to or consent from the State.
The State appealed; the Court of Special Appeals held the sentence was illegal because it fell below the plea agreement floor and lacked State consent.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the judge was bound by the plea terms once he accepted them and that deviation without both parties’ consent produces an illegal sentence under Md. Rule 4–243(c)(3) and Rule 4–345(a).

Issue	Smith's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the court was bound to the plea terms after accepting the plea	Judge did not formally approve plea; could impose probation before judgment; agreement ambiguous	Court accepted plea and was bound to the agreed disposition; deviation required consent	Court bound to plea once it accepted proffered facts; judge couldn’t unilaterally deviate
Whether probation before judgment was permissible given silence in plea	A reasonable lay person could interpret silence to allow PBJ; PBJ is as favorable as conviction for Smith	Plea plainly contemplated a conviction and actual incarceration; PBJ was inconsistent with bargain	Agreement unambiguous: reasonable lay person would expect conviction and jail; PBJ not permitted
Whether deviation without State consent renders sentence illegal	Deviation did not change substantive outcome for Smith; should be allowed	Sentence below binding plea without State consent is illegal and correctable anytime	Deviation without both parties’ consent is an illegal sentence subject to correction under Rule 4–345(a)
Standard for interpreting plea terms when State challenges sentence	Apply Cuffley/Baines (reasonable lay interpretation) favoring defendant	When State challenges, focus on whether State got its bargain; consider parties’ expectations	Both standards apply contextually; here terms were clear and State did not receive its bargain

Bonilla v. State, 443 Md. 1 (2015) (sentence below binding plea without State consent is inherently illegal)
Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 (2010) (plea terms are interpreted by what a reasonable lay person in defendant’s position would understand)
Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604 (2010) (same interpretive standard; defendant entitled to specific performance when court exceeds agreed guideline)
Dotson v. State, 321 Md. 515 (1991) (importance of enforcing plea agreements to promote certainty and efficiency)
Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475 (2004) (once plea accepted, court required to impose agreed sentence if conditions fulfilled)